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* Mike Koehler is an Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  Professor 
Koehler is the founder and editor of the website FCPA Professor (www.fcpaprofessor.com) and 
author of the book “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New Era” (Edward Elgar Publishers, 
2014).  Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are informed by a decade of legal practice 
experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered in this article, current as of 
January 1, 2015, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, as 
well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and 
Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve 
FCPA scrutiny.  Interested readers can learn more about these topics, and others, by reading Mike 
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517. The author’s FCPA Professor website 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) is also a useful resource for general FCPA information, specifically 
the FCPA 101 page of the site (http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101). 
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This article, part of an annual series, provides a snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related developments from 2014 and will be of value to 
anyone who seeks an informed base of knowledge regarding the FCPA and related 
legal and policy issues.  Specifically, this article uses FCPA enforcement action data 
and other top FCPA or related developments to highlight noteworthy issues from 
2014 such as: numerous enforcement statistics; the wide spectrum of FCPA 
enforcement actions; the gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement; 
the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve alleged instances of 
FCPA scrutiny; and judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related enforcement theories. 
Introduction 
This article, part of an annual series, provides a snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and related developments from 2014 and will be of value to anyone 
who seeks an informed based of knowledge regarding the FCPA and related legal 
and policy issues.  Although this article is primarily about the FCPA and its 
enforcement, reference is also made to other notable non-FCPA developments in 
2014 to best appreciate the many controversial aspects of FCPA enforcement. 
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement statistics — both 
corporate and individual enforcement actions — from 2014 and places the statistics 
in the proper historical perspective. 
Part II of this article uses FCPA enforcement action data to highlight noteworthy 
issues from 2014.  Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) the wide 
spectrum of FCPA allegations — from multi-million dollar payments in connection 
with large infrastructure projects to $4 payments — and how the breadth of such 
allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject to the FCPA; (ii) 
the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement and a relevant 
data point that helps explain the gap as well as the significant policy issues which 
flow from the gap; and (iii) the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to 
resolve alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny. 
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related developments from 
2014.  Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) judicial scrutiny of FCPA 
enforcement agency theories, including the first case of precedent regarding the 
FCPA’s important “foreign official” element; and (ii) judicial scrutiny of enforcement 
theories related to FCPA enforcement and how non-FCPA legal developments 
should cause pause as to certain FCPA enforcement theories. 
I. 2014 FCPA Enforcement Overview 
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement statistics — both 
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corporate and individual enforcement actions — from 2014 and places the statistics 
in the proper historical perspective. 
A. DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement  
As demonstrated in Table I, the DOJ collected approximately $1.25 billion in 
settlement amounts in seven corporate FCPA enforcement actions1 in 2014. 
 
Table I — 2014 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Company 
 
Fine Resolution 
Vehicle2 
Origin3 Related Individual 
Action4 
Alstom 
Entities5 
$772.3 
million 
Plea / Plea / DPA / 
DPA6 
Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigation7 
Yes (as to a portion of 
the alleged conduct)8 
 
1. Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core approach 
focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue involves 
a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case), regardless of whether the 
corporate enforcement action involves a parent company, a subsidiary or both (as is frequently the 
case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC bring any related individual enforcement 
actions (as is occasionally the case).   For additional information on this method of quantifying FCPA 
enforcement, see What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action.  This method of computing 
FCPA statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit 
Chief). This approach is also a commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other 
areas.  See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice In Targeting and Penalizing 
Individual Defendants, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION 
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-
penalizing-individual-defendants/. 
2. DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution 
agreement.  To learn more about these agreements in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The 
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517. 
3. Refers to the event or events which initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA 
enforcement action. See id. at 911.  
4. Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement action. See Koehler, 
supra note 3, at 924-25. 
5. Press Release, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve 
Foreign Bribery Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery (last 
updated Dec. 29, 2014). 
6. Id. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against Alstom S.A. resolved via a 
plea agreement; a criminal information against Alstom Network Schweiz AG resolved via a plea 
agreement; a criminal information against Alstom Power Inc. resolved via a DPA; and a 
criminal information against Alstom Grid Inc. resolved via a DPA.  
7. Issues to Consider From the Alstom Action, FCPA Professor (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-the-alstom-action. 
8. The Alstom enforcement action alleged conduct in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the 
Bahamas, and Taiwan.  The Indonesia conduct also served as the basis for several individual 
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Company 
 
Fine Resolution 
Vehicle2 
Origin3 Related Individual 
Action4 
Avon 
Entities9 
$67.6 million Plea / DPA Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
Dallas 
Airmotive 
Inc.10 
$14 million DPA Related 
Investigation11 
No 
Bio-Rad 
Laboratorie
s, Inc.12 
$14.4 million NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
Hewlett-
Packard 
Co. 
Entities13 
$76.7 million Plea / DPA / NPA14 Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigation15 
No 
 
 
enforcement actions. See, Current and Former Alstom Employees Charged in Connection With 
Payments in Indonesia,   FCPA Professor (April 24, 2013),  http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
current-and-former-alstom-employees-charged-in-connection-with-payments-in-indonesia. 
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the FCPA By Concealing 
$8 Million In Gifts To Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-china-
pleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-concealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials (last updated Dec. 18, 
2014). 
10. Press Release, Dallas Airmotive Inc. Admits Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Volations and Agrees to 
Pay $14 Million Criminal Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dallas-airmotive-inc-admits-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-violations-
and-agrees-pay-14 (last updated Dec. 10, 2014). 
11. The enforcement action is believed to be causally related to prior FCPA enforcement actions 
against other aircraft maintenance companies. See Dallas Airmotive Inc., the Latest Aircraft 
Maintenance Company to Resolve a FCPA Enforcement Action,  FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 12, 
2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/dallas-airmotive-inc-the-latest-aircraft-maintenance-
company-to-resolve-an-fcpa-enforcement-action.  
12. Press Release, Bio-Rad Laboratories Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and 
Agrees to Pay $14.35 Million Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/bio-rad-laboratories-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-
1435 (last updated Nov. 4, 2014).  
13. Press Release, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, (April 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-
guilty-foreign-bribery (last updated Dec. 16, 2014). 
14. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against HP Russia resolved via a plea 
agreement; a criminal information against HP Poland resolved via a DPA; and an NPA with 
HP Mexico. 
15. The enforcement action appears to have been the result of a previous German and Russian law 
enforcement investigation.  See H-P Under Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 16, 
2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/h-p-under-scrutiny. 
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Company 
 
Fine Resolution 
Vehicle2 
Origin3 Related Individual 
Action4 
Marubeni 
Corp.16 
$88 million Plea Related 
Investigation17 
No 
Alcoa 
World 
Alumina 
LLC18 
$209 million19 Plea Related Civil 
Lawsuit20 
No 
 
TOTAL 
  
$1.25 billion 
   
 
B. SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement  
As demonstrated in Table II, in seven corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 
2014 the SEC collected approximately $327 million in settlement amounts. 
 
Table II — 2013 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Company Settlement 
Amount 
 
Resolution 
Vehicle 
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action 
Avon21 $67.4 million Settled Civil 
Complaint 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
 
16. Press Release, Marubeni Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and to Pay 
An $88 Million Dollar Fine, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (March 19, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-charges-
and-pay-88-million-fine (last updated Sept. 15, 2014).  
17. The enforcement action was related to the April 2013 FCPA enforcement action against various 
current and former employees of Alstom. See Current And Former Alstom Employees Charged In 
Connection With Payments In Indonesia, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/current-and-former-alstom-employees-charged-in-connection-with-
payments-in-indonesia. 
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery 
and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcoa-
world-alumina-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-and-pay-223-million-fines-and (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
19. Id. In addition, the company agreed to pay an administrative forfeiture of $14 million.  
20. See Alan Katz, Alcoa Pays $384 Million to Resolve Bahrain-Bribery Probe, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 
9, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-09/alcoa-pays-384-million-to-
resolve-foreign-bribery-probe.  The enforcement action resulted from a 2008 civil lawsuit between 
Alba and Alcoa.   
21. Press Release, SEC Charges Avon With FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 17, 
2014),  http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-285.html#.VJOLUV4CB. 
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Company Settlement 
Amount 
 
Resolution 
Vehicle 
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action 
Bruker 
Corp.22 
$2.4 million Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
Bio-Rad 
Laboratories
, Inc.23 
$40.7 million Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
Layne 
Christensen 
Co.24 
$5.1 million Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
Smith & 
Wesson 
Corp.25 
$2 million Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Related 
Individual 
Enforcement 
Action26 
No 
Hewlett-
Packard 
Co.27 
$34 million Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigatio
n28 
No 
 
22. Press Release, SEC Charges Massachusetts-Based Scientific Instruments Manufacturer with FCPA 
Violations, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543708934#.VI9cnyvF91Y. 
23. Press Release, SEC Charges California-Based Bio-Rad Laboratories With FCPA Violations, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1370543347364#.VGK-ifnF91Z. 
24. Press Release, SEC Charges Texas-Based Layne Christensen Company With FCPA Violations, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1370543291857#.VGK_BfnF91Z. 
25. Press Release, SEC Charges Smith & Wesson With FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 
(Jun. 28, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/ 
1370542384677#.VGK_1_nF91Z. 
26. See Stung By The Sting – Smith & Wesson Resolves FCPA Scrutiny That Originated With The Africa 
Sting, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jul. 29 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/stung-by-the-sting-smith-
wesson-resolves-fcpa-scrutiny-that-originated-with-the-africa-sting.  The enforcement action 
originated after a Smith & Wesson employee was criminally charged in the DOJ’s manufactured 
Africa Sting enforcement action.   
27. Press Release, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 
9, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#. 
VGLAYvnF91Y. 
28. Koehler, supra note 16. The enforcement action appears to have been the result of a previous 
German and Russian law enforcement investigation.   
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Company Settlement 
Amount 
 
Resolution 
Vehicle 
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action 
Alcoa Inc.29 $175 million30 Administrative 
Cease and Desist 
Order 
Related 
Civil 
Lawsuit31 
No 
 
TOTAL 
 
$327 million 
   
 
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I and II is 
useful and informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement 
agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement 
actions.32  On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data in 
the aggregate is also useful and informative in that it provides a more holistic view 
of FCPA enforcement.   
 
29. Press Release, SEC Charges Alcoa With FCPA Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540596936#.VGLA6fnF91Y. 
30. See, id. $14 million of this amount was deemed satisfied by the payment of the forfeiture in the 
related DOJ action.   
31. See, Katz, supra note 21. The enforcement action resulted from a 2008 civil lawsuit between Alba 
and Alcoa.   
32. See, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice and the Enf’t Div. of the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.  As evident from Tables I and II, there is 
substantial overlap between the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs.  FCPA enforcement 
actions against issuers typically involve related and coordinated enforcement actions by the DOJ 
for criminal FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal 
control violations) and by the SEC for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or 
books and records and internal control violations).  Enforcement actions from 2014 fitting this 
pattern include:  Avon, Bio-Rad, HP, and Alcoa.  The overlap, however, between the DOJ and SEC’s 
FCPA enforcement programs is not complete.  As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over 
“issuers” (companies – domestic and foreign – with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or 
otherwise required to make filings with the SEC).  In other words, the SEC generally does not have 
jurisdiction over private companies or foreign companies that are not issuers.  Thus, certain FCPA 
enforcement actions from 2014, such as Alstom, Dallas Airmotive, and Marubeni did not have an 
SEC component.  As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic 
concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized under 
U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct 
“while in the territory of the U.S.”  Id. at 11.  In addition, the DOJ has a higher burden of proof in 
a criminal prosecution.  As a result, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion, certain FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2014 such as Bruker, Layne Christensen, and Smith & Wesson only 
included an SEC component.  As to the DOJ’s discretion, the DOJ has stated that it “has declined 
to prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numerous cases based on the particular facts 
and circumstances presented in those matters, taking into account the available evidence.”  Id. at 
75. 
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C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement  
In 2014, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $1.6 billion in ten 
core corporate enforcement actions.  The average settlement amount was 
approximately $159 million and the median was approximately $72 million.  The 
range of settlements was, on the high end, $772 million (Alstom), and on the low 
end, $2 million (Smith & Wesson). 
As in most years, certain FCPA enforcement actions significantly skewed 2014 
FCPA enforcement statistics. For instance, one enforcement action (Alstom) 
represented approximately 48% of the total settlement amount and two 
enforcement actions (Alstom and Alcoa) represented approximately 72% of the 
total settlement amount. 
A popular issue, or so it seems, is to analyze whether FCPA enforcement is up 
or down in any given year.  Such year-to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and 
the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value however given 
that many non-substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate 
FCPA enforcement action.33 
Nevertheless, and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for what they are, the 
issue remains:  how best to analyze and interpret FCPA statistics over time?  As 
demonstrated by the below tables, arguments can be made that corporate FCPA 
enforcement was down and up in 2014 compared to 2013 and prior years.  
The below tables use the “core” approach and demonstrate that both DOJ and 
SEC corporate enforcement in 2013 were down from historical averages.34 
 
Table III — Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2014) 
Year Core Actions 
 
2014 7 
2013 7 
2012 9 
 
33. Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component are typically 
announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it 
is common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish 
its investigation of the conduct at issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company.  
Additional non-substantive factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action, 
although far from an exclusive list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee 
departures or leaves) as well as securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA 
enforcement action. Id. 
34. Corporate FCPA Enforcement was Down in 2013, Or Was it Up, Or Was it Down?, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-was-down-in-2013-or-
was-it-up-or-was-it-down. 
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Year Core Actions 
 
2011 11 
2010 17 
 
Table IV — Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2014) 
Year Core Actions 
 
2014 7 
2013 8 
2012 8 
2011 13 
2010 19 
 
However, if one analyzes corporate FCPA enforcement statistics based on 
settlement amounts, corporate FCPA enforcement by the DOJ was up in 2014 
compared to prior years.  In fact, the $1.25 billion the DOJ collected in corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions in 2014 set an all-time record. 
 
Table V— Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts  
(2010–2014) 
Year Settlement Amounts 
 
2014 $1.25 billion 
2013 $420 million 
2012 $142 million 
2011 $355 million 
2010 $870 million 
 
As highlighted in the below chart, while settlement amounts in corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions by the SEC were up in 2014 compared to prior years, the 
aggregate $327 million in corporate SEC FCPA settlements did not set an all-time 
record similar to DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2014. 
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Table VI — SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010 – 2014) 
Year Settlement Amounts 
 
2014 $327 million 
2013 $300 million 
2012 $118 million 
2011 $148 million 
2010 $530 million 
 
What is the best way to analyze and interpret these statistics? Consider the 
following analogy.  In year one, a city issues 100 speeding tickets and collects 
$20,000 in fines on those tickets.  In year two, a city issues ninety speeding tickets; 
however, because certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects $25,000 in 
fines on those tickets.  Was there less enforcement in year two compared to year one?  
It is assumed that most would say enforcement in year two was less than in year 
one, even though the city collected more money from speeding tickets in year two.   
The same logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistics, and for this reason it is 
more accurate and reliable to analyze FCPA enforcement statistics by focusing on 
unique instances of FCPA scrutiny (and not settlement amounts) and tracking 
enforcement actions using the “core” approach.  Using this approach, corporate 
FCPA enforcement in 2014 was down compared to historical averages, and indeed, 
2014 saw the second lowest number of core enforcement actions since 2007. 
This point is best demonstrated by the below table which aggregates DOJ and 
SEC enforcement statistics over time and highlights notable circumstances which 
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year. 
 
Table VII — Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2014) 
Year Core Actions Settlement Amounts Of Note 
 
2007 15 $149 million Six enforcement actions 
involved Iraq Oil for Food 
conduct; these enforcement 
actions comprised 40% of 
all enforcement actions 
and approximately 50% of 
the $149 million amount. 
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Year Core Actions Settlement Amounts Of Note 
 
2008 10 $885 million The $800 million Siemens 
enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
90% of the $885 million 
amount. 
 
2009 11 $645 million The $579 million KBR / 
Halliburton Bonny Island, 
Nigeria enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
90% of the $645 million 
amount. 
 
2010 21 $1.4 billion Six enforcement actions, 
all resolved on the same 
day, involved various oil 
and gas companies use of 
Panalpina in Nigeria. 
Panalpina also resolved an 
enforcement action on the 
same day. 
Two enforcement actions 
(Technip and Eni / 
Snamprogetti) involved 
Bonny Island conduct.  
In other words, there were 
fourteen unique corporate 
enforcement actions in 
2010. Of further note, the 
two Bonny Island 
enforcement actions, 
Technip ($338 million) and 
Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 
million) comprised 
approximately 50% of the 
$1.4 billion amount. 
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Year Core Actions Settlement Amounts Of Note 
 
2011 16 $503 million The $219 million JGC 
Corp. enforcement action 
involved Bonny Island 
conduct and comprised 
approximately 44% of the 
$503 million amount. 
 
2012 12 $260 million No enforcement actions 
significantly skewed the 
statistics. 
 
2013 9 $720 million The $398 million total 
enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
55% of the $720 million 
amount. 
 
2014 
 
10 $1.6 billion Two enforcement actions 
(Alstom - $772 million and 
Alcoa - $384 million) 
comprised approximately 
72% of the $1.6 billion 
amount.   
TOTALS 104 $6.23 billion  
 
D. Individual FCPA Enforcement 
In 2014, the DOJ filed or announced FCPA criminal charges against ten 
individuals as highlighted below.   
 
A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
155 
Table VII — 2014 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Individual Employer / Former 
Employer 
Related Corporate 
Enforcement Action 
 
Dmitry Firtash 
Andras Knopp  
Suren Gevorgyan 
Gajendra Lal 
Periyasamy 
Sunderalingam35 
 
Associated with DF 
Group 
No 
Benito Chinea 
Joseph DeMeneses36 
 
 
Direct Access Partners No 
Joseph Sigelman 
Knut Hammarskjold 
Gregory Weisman37 
PetroTiger Ltd. No 
 
In 2014, the SEC brought FCPA civil charges against two individuals as 
highlighted below.  The enforcement action was notable in that it was the first SEC 
individual FCPA enforcement action since April 2012.38 
 
 
35. In addition, K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao was also charged in the case, but not with FCPA offenses. See 
Press Release, Six Defendants Indicted in Alleged Conspiracy to Bribe Government Officials in India 
to Mine Titanium Minerals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-
defendants-indicted-alleged-conspiracy-bribe-government-officials-india-mine-titanium (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2014).. 
36. Press Release, CEO and Managing Partner of Wall Street Broker-Dealer Charged with Massive 
International Bribery Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/ceo-and-managing-partner-wall-street-broker-dealer-charged-massive-international-bribery (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2014). 
37. Press Release, Foreign Bribery Charges Unsealed Against Former Chief Executive Officers of Oil 
Services Company, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/foreign-
bribery-charges-unsealed-against-former-chief-executive-officers-oil-services-company (last 
updated Oct. 9, 2014). 
38. “World Tour” for Saudi Officials Results in Individual SEC FCPA Enforcement Action, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/world-tour-for-saudi-officials-results-in-
individual-sec-fcpa-enforcement-action. 
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Table VIII — 2014 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Individual Employer / Former 
Employer 
Related Corporate 
Enforcement Action 
 
Stephen Timms and 
Yasser Ramahi39 
Associated with FLIR 
Systems Inc. 
No 
 
The below tables provide a historical overview of DOJ and SEC individual FCPA 
enforcement actions between 2007 and 2014. 
 
Table IV — DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions40 
Year Individuals Charged With Criminal 
FCPA Offenses 
 
2014 10 
2013 12 
2012 2 
2011 10 
2010 33  
(including 22 in the Africa Sting case) 
2009 18 
2008 14 
2007 7 
 
Table X — SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions41 
 
Year Individuals Charged With Civil 
FCPA Offenses 
 
2014 2 
2013 0 
2012 4 
2011 12 
 
39. Press Release, SEC Sanctions Two Former Defense Contractor Employees for FCPA Violations, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1370543472839#.VI9dwyvF91b. 
40. A Focus on DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-fcpa-individual-prosecutions-2. 
41. A Focus on SEC FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-actions-2. 
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Year Individuals Charged With Civil 
FCPA Offenses 
 
2010 7 
2009 5 
2008 5 
2007 7 
 
With a proper foundation in FCPA statistics, both in 2014 and over time, this 
article next uses certain statistics and other information to highlight persistent and 
problematic issues associated with FCPA enforcement. 
II. Issues Highlighted by the Statistics   
Part II of this article uses FCPA enforcement action data to highlight noteworthy 
issues from 2014.  Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) the wide 
spectrum of FCPA allegations  — from multi-million dollar payments in connection 
with large infrastructure projects to $4 payments — and how the breadth of such 
allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject to the FCPA; (ii) 
the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement and a relevant 
data point that helps explain the gap as well as the significant policy issues which 
flow from the gap; and (iii) the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to 
resolve alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny. 
A. The Wide Spectrum of FCPA Enforcement Actions 
This section highlights the wide spectrum of FCPA allegations in 2014 and how 
the breadth of such allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject 
to the FCPA. 
At its relevant core, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offering or 
providing of anything of value, to a “foreign official,” in order to “obtain or retain 
business,” with corrupt intent.42 Against this statutory backdrop, the DOJ and SEC 
have stated in connection with official FCPA Guidance that they are “focused on 
bribes of consequence — ones that have a fundamentally corrosive effect on the way 
companies do business abroad” and “payments of real and substantial value that 
clearly represent an unambiguous intent to bribe a foreign official to obtain or retain 
business.”43  
 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998). 
43. The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
the-guidance-press-conference. 
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Certain allegations in 2014 FCPA enforcement actions surely fit the type of 
conduct that the enforcement agencies have articulated is the focus of their 
respective FCPA enforcement programs.  For instance, both the Alstom and 
Marubeni enforcement actions concerned multi-million dollar alleged bribes to 
alleged Indonesian foreign officials in connection with large infrastructure projects.44 
Likewise, an enforcement action against an Alcoa entity concerned multi-million 
dollar alleged bribes to alleged senior officials of the Kingdom of Bahrain in order to 
obtain and retain a long-term alumina supply agreement.45 
On the other hand, many allegations in various 2014 FCPA enforcement actions 
seemed to run counter to the sensibly articulated focus of FCPA enforcement.  For 
instance, the SEC brought two enforcement actions based primarily on alleged 
excessive travel and entertainment benefits provided to alleged “foreign officials.”  
In an enforcement action against Bruker Corp., the SEC found that “from 2005 
through 2011, the Bruker China Offices paid approximately $119,710 to fund 17 
trips for Chinese government officials that were for the most part not related to any 
legitimate business purpose.”46 Likewise, in an individual enforcement action, the 
SEC found that former employees of FLIR Systems Inc. “arranged expensive travel, 
entertainment, and personal items for foreign government officials in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in order to influence the officials to obtain new business for 
their employer . . . and to retain existing business for FLIR with the Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Interior.”47 In addition, the SEC’s enforcement action against Avon 
included allegations concerning handbags, payments “for meals and entertainment 
expenses under $200 per occurrence,” and use of “corporate boxes at the China Open 
tennis tournament.”48 
The monetary threshold of an alleged bribe was also lowered by the enforcement 
agencies in 2014.  Even though the Chief of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated 
in connection with official FCPA Guidance that one purpose of the Guidance was to 
 
44. See Press Release, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve 
Foreign Bribery Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery (last 
updated Dec. 29, 2014); Press Release, Marubeni Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign 
Bribery Charges and to Pay an $88 Million Fine, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 19, 2014),  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-charges-
and-pay-88-million-fine (last updated Sept. 15, 2014). 
45. Press Release, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay Millions in 
Fines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcoa-world-alumina-
agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-and-pay-223-million-fines-and (last updated Sept. 15, 2014). 
46. Bruker Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 73835, 2014 WL 7016166 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
47. Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi, Exchange Act Release No. 73616, 2014 WL 6338805 (Nov. 17, 
2014).  
48. Complaint at 11-12, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 14-CV-9956 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 17, 2014). 
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“clear up some myths about the type of conduct that gets prosecuted under the FCPA 
— that it is not the $5 cup of coffee, or the one off $50 gift to a public official, that 
companies need to be concerned about,” the SEC’s FCPA enforcement action against 
Layne Christensen Company included an allegation about a $4 payment.49 In the 
words of the SEC: 
“Layne Christensen made more than $10,000 in small payments to 
foreign officials through various customs and clearing agents that it 
used in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and the 
[Democratic Republic of Congo]. These payments ranged from $4 to 
$1,700 and were characterized in invoices submitted by the 
agents as, among other things, “intervention,” “honoraires,” 
“commissions,” and “service fees.”50 
The above type of allegations were not unique to 2014, as other recent FCPA 
enforcement actions have included allegations about: perfume, dresses and 
handbags; a bottle of wine; a watch; a camera, kitchen appliances and business suits; 
television sets, laptops and appliances; and tea sets and office furniture allegedly 
provided to alleged foreign officials.51 Nevertheless, the 2014 allegations serve as a 
reminder that the enforcement agencies continue to send confusing compliance 
messages to those subject to the FCPA. 
In addition to the enforcement agency policy statements highlighted above, the 
FCPA Guidance states: 
“Devoting a disproportionate amount of time policing modest 
entertainment and gift-giving instead of focusing on large 
government bids, questionable payments to third-party consultants, 
or excessive discounts to resellers and distributors may indicate 
that a company’s compliance program is ineffective.  A $50 million 
contract with a government agency in a high-risk country warrants 
greater scrutiny than modest routine gifts and entertainment.”52 
In connection with the FCPA Guidance, the SEC stated that it was “interested in 
companies spending compliance dollars in the most sensible way” and hoped that 
the Guidance and the hypotheticals provided in it would help companies decide 
where they can “minimize investment and where they can maximize it.”53 The DOJ 
similarly added that it wants compliance programs “to address real matters of 
 
49. Koehler, supra note 44. 
50. Layne Christensen Co., Exchange Act Release No. 73437, 2014 WL 5423780 (Oct. 27, 2014).  
51. Do Lanny Breuer And Robert Khuzami Actually Read FCPA Enforcement Actions?, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-lanny-breuer-and-robert-khuzami-
actually-read-fcpa-enforcement-actions. (Containing links to original source documents). 
52. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND SEC. EXCH. 
COMM. (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf. 
53. The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
the-guidance-press-conference. 
14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2016) 
160 
concern.”54 
Because few business organizations subject to the FCPA have $50 million 
contracts with government agencies in high-risk countries — or even any business 
with government agencies — the end result of the above cursory and often non-
determinative allegations in many FCPA enforcement actions is to induce risk-
averse business organizations to act contrary to the sensible enforcement agency 
guidance and statements highlighted above. 
In short, if the DOJ and SEC are genuine about their message that they are only 
“focused on bribes of consequence,” on payments of “real and substantial value,” and 
in companies spending compliance dollars in the “most sensible way,” there is 
something very easy and practical for the enforcement agencies to do: only allege 
conduct in an FCPA enforcement action that actually determines the ultimate 
outcome of the enforcement action. 
B. The Wide Gap Between Corporate and Individual FCPA 
Enforcement 
This section highlights the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA 
enforcement and a relevant data point that helps explain the gap, as well as the 
significant policy issues which flow from the gap. 
Key to achieving deterrence in the FCPA context is prosecuting individuals to the 
extent the individual’s conduct legitimately satisfies the elements of an FCPA 
violation. For a corporate employee with job duties that provide an opportunity to 
violate the FCPA, it is easy to dismiss corporate money being used to pay settlement 
amounts. On the other hand, it is not easy to dismiss hearing of an individual with 
a similar background and job duties being criminally charged and sent to federal 
prison for violating the FCPA. 
The enforcement agencies have long recognized that an FCPA enforcement 
program based solely on corporate fines is not effective and does not adequately deter 
future FCPA violations.55 
Such rhetoric continued in 2014 as the Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s 
Criminal Division stated: 
“Corporations do not act, but for the actions of individuals.  In all 
but a few cases, an individual or group of individuals is responsible 
for the corporation’s criminal conduct. The prosecution of culpable 
 
54. Id. 
55. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 961, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428555. 
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individuals — including corporate executives — for their criminal 
wrongdoing continues to be a high priority for the department.”56 
Likewise, the Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated: 
“[A]ctions against individuals have the largest deterrent impact. 
Individual accountability is a powerful deterrent because people pay 
attention and alter their conduct when they personally face 
potential punishment. And so in the FCPA arena as well as all other 
areas of our enforcement efforts, we are very focused on attempting 
to bring cases against individuals.”57 
However, as in prior years, the enforcement agencies rhetoric about individual 
FCPA enforcement actions remains hollow and there is a wide gap between 
corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions.   
As highlighted in Table I, of the seven DOJ corporate enforcement actions from 
2014, six (86%) have not, at least yet, resulted in any related charges against 
employees of the corporate entity resolving the enforcement action.  Likewise, as 
highlighted in Table II, of the seven SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 
2014, seven (100%) have not, at least yet, resulted in any related charges against 
employees of the corporate entity resolving the enforcement action. 
The wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions in 
2014 was not an anomaly.  Indeed, since 2008 the DOJ has resolved sixty-seven 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and fifty (75%) have not, at least yet, resulted 
in any DOJ charges against company employees.58  Similarly, since 2008 the SEC has 
resolved seventy-two corporate FCPA enforcement actions and sixty (83%) have not, at least 
yet, resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.59  The higher SEC 
figure compared to the DOJ figure is notable in that the SEC, as a civil law 
enforcement agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action. 
To be sure, the DOJ and SEC have brought FCPA enforcement actions against 
individuals.  Indeed, as highlighted in Table VII, the DOJ did charge ten individuals 
with FCPA violations in 2014.  However, the DOJ individual actions followed a 
typical “clustering” approach in which just three “core” actions resulted in the ten 
individual prosecutions.  Such an approach was consistent with prior years in that 
 
56. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks by 
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie R. Caldwell at the 22nd Annual Ethics 
and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-
assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics. 
57. Andrew Ceresney, Remarks at 31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
(Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370543493598#.VPiEJvnF-Sp. 
58. A Focus On DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-fcpa-individual-prosecutions-3. 
59. A Focus on SEC FCPA Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://wwwfcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-actions-3. 
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since 2008 the DOJ has charged ninety-nine individuals with criminal FCPA 
offenses, yet 58% of the individuals have been in just five “core” actions and 78% of 
the individuals have been in just eleven “core” actions.60 In other words, DOJ FCPA 
individual enforcement numbers are significantly skewed by a small handful of 
enforcement actions.  
The same is true for SEC FCPA individual enforcement actions.  As highlighted 
in Table VIII and discussed above, for the first time since April 2012, the SEC 
brought an individual FCPA enforcement action in November 2014.  The two 
individuals charged were in the same “core” action.  Such an approach was 
consistent with prior years in that since 2008 the SEC has charged thirty-five 
individuals with civil FCPA offenses, yet 60% of the individuals have been in just 
five “core” actions.61 In other words and like the DOJ statistics, SEC FCPA 
individual enforcement numbers are significantly skewed by a small handful of 
enforcement actions. 
Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement agency rhetoric about individual 
prosecutions, the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement 
raises several significant legal and policy issues.  For starters, it causes one to 
legitimately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate FCPA 
enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts. Indeed, others have rightly asked the 
“but why was nobody charged” question in connection with many corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions.62 
However, an equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in 
connection with most corporate FCPA enforcement actions may have to do with the 
quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.  As 
highlighted in Table I, DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions are often resolved 
through deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements.  Indeed, 
since 2010, 86% of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcements actions have involved either 
an NPA or DPA.63 
NPAs and DPAs are not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny and are often 
agreed to by business organizations for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not 
necessarily because the conduct at issue violated the FCPA.  Indeed, prior to 
becoming SEC Chair, Mary Jo White stated a “fear [that] the deferred prosecution 
[agreement] is becoming a vehicle to show results.”64 Likewise, former DOJ Attorney 
 
60. Koehler, supra note 59. 
61. Koehler, supra note 60. 
62. James B. Stewart, Bribery, but Nobody Was Charged, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/business/25stewart.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&. 
63. DOJ Enforcement Of The FCPA – Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-5. 
64. An Informed And Forceful Critique Of NPAs And DPAs By . . . Guess Who?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 
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General Alberto Gonzales stated: 
“It is ‘easy, much easier quite frankly’ for the DOJ to resolve 
FCPA inquiries with NPAs and DPAs; such resolution vehicles have 
‘less of a toll’ on the DOJ’s budget and such agreements ‘provide 
revenue’ to the DOJ.  It is all ‘unfortunate’ [Is this the end of the 
sentence? Unclear from quotation placement.] 
“In an ironic twist, the more that American companies elect to settle 
and not force the DOJ to defend its aggressive interpretation of the 
[FCPA], the more aggressive DOJ has become in its interpretation 
of the law and its prosecution decisions.”65 
Perhaps most telling, Mark Mendelsohn (former chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit), 
has talked about the “danger” of NPAs and DPAs and how “it is tempting for the 
[Justice Department] or the SEC . . . to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs 
that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.”66 
Individuals charged with FCPA violations, on the other hand, face a deprivation 
of personal liberty, damage to their personal reputations, and personal financial 
consequences and are thus more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of 
proof as to all FCPA elements. In other words, perhaps the more appropriate 
question is not “but why was nobody charged” in connection with most corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions, but rather do corporate NPAs and DPAs necessarily 
represent provable FCPA violations?   
The following working hypothesis seeks to assess this question: 
• Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges 
against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution that the 
corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA violations, represent a 
higher quality FCPA enforcement action (in the eyes of the 
DOJ) and are thus more likely to result in related FCPA 
criminal charges against company employees. 
• Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement 
action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality 
FCPA enforcement action and are thus less likely to result in 
related FCPA criminal charges against company employees 
given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its high 
burden of proof. 
The below statistics provide a compelling data point concerning the quality and 
 
25, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/an-informed-and-forceful-critique-of-npas-and-dpas-by-
guess-who. 
65. Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales Criticizes Various Aspects Of DOJ FCPA Enforcement, 
FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-alberto-
gonzales-criticizes-various-aspects-of-doj-fcpa-enforcement. 
66. Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 CORP. CRIME REP. 35 (Sept. 10, 2010), 
available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn091010.html.  
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legitimacy of many corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions. Since NPAs and 
DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004, there have been 
eighty-three corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.67 
• Fourteen of these corporate enforcement actions were the result 
of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the 
corporate entity to FCPA violations.  Ten of these corporate 
enforcement actions (71%) resulted in related criminal charges 
of company employees. 
• Fifty-three of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved 
solely with an NPA or DPA.  In only five instances (9%) were 
there related criminal charges of company employees. 
• A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is a hybrid 
action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some 
entity in the corporate family — usually a foreign subsidiary — 
and an NPA or DPA against the parent company.  Since 
the introduction of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context there 
have been sixteen such corporate enforcement actions.  In five 
of these actions (31%) there were related criminal charges of 
company employees.  
The “but why was nobody charged?” question is also tempting to ask in connection 
with SEC FCPA enforcement given that 83% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
since 2008 have not, at least yet, resulted in any SEC charges against company 
employees. Yet, like with the DOJ figures, there may be an equally plausible reason 
why so few individuals have been charged in connection with most corporate SEC 
FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason may have to do with the quality and 
legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place. 
With the SEC, the issue is not so much NPAs or DPAs (even though the SEC has 
used such vehicles two times to resolve an FCPA enforcement action: a DPA with 
Tenaris in 2011 and a NPA with Ralph Lauren in 2013, neither of which resulted in 
any related charges against company employees). Rather, the issue seems to be 
the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy, as well as the SEC’s increased 
use of administrative actions (a topic discussed in greater detail in the next section). 
Indeed, a notable development from 2014 was the Second Circuit concluding in a 
non-FCPA case that challenged the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy 
that SEC settlements are not necessarily about the truth, but pragmatism.68 
Individuals in an SEC FCPA enforcement, even if only a civil action and even if 
frequently allowed to settle on neither admit nor deny terms or through an 
 
67. DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-at-play-4. 
68. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2nd Cir. 2014). 
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administrative process, have their personal reputation and finances at stake and are 
thus more likely than corporate entities to challenge the SEC and force it to satisfy 
its burden of proof as to all FCPA elements. 
As to the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions used to resolve alleged 
instances of FCPA scrutiny discussed in greater detail below, it is worth highlighting 
here that since 2013 the SEC has used administrative actions to resolve nine 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and in none of these actions have there been 
related SEC enforcement actions against company employees.69 In other words, and 
like in the DOJ context, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but why was 
nobody charged?” in connection with most SEC corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions, but rather do SEC corporate FCPA settlements necessarily represent 
provable FCPA violations? 
The above statistics should prompt questions about the quality and legitimacy of 
many corporate FCPA enforcement actions and may explain the wide gap between 
corporate and individual FCPA enforcement.  The wide gap between corporate and 
individual enforcement, whether in the FCPA context or more broadly, raises 
important legal and policy issues.  Indeed, DOJ Attorney General Eric Holder stated 
in 2014: 
“[T]he [DOJ] recognizes the inherent value of bringing enforcement 
actions against individuals, as opposed to simply the companies that 
employ them.  We believe that doing so is both important — and 
appropriate — for several reasons: 
First, it enhances accountability.  Despite the growing 
jurisprudence that seeks to equate corporations with people, 
corporate misconduct must necessarily be committed by flesh-and-
blood human beings.  So wherever misconduct occurs within a 
company, it is essential that we seek to identify the decision-makers 
at the company who ought to be held responsible. 
Second, it promotes fairness — because, when misconduct is the 
work of a known bad actor, or a handful of known bad actors, it’s not 
right for punishment to be borne exclusively by the company, its 
employees, and its innocent shareholders. 
And finally, it has a powerful deterrent effect.  All other things being 
equal, few things discourage criminal activity at a firm – or 
incentivize changes in corporate behavior — like the prospect of 
individual decision-makers being held accountable.  A corporation 
may enter a guilty plea and still see its stock price rise the next 
day.  But an individual who is found guilty of a serious fraud crime 
is most likely going to prison.”70 
 
69. Koehler, supra note 60. 
70. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions 
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Yet despite the above rhetoric, the statistics highlighted in this section speak for 
themselves and there is an undeniably wide gap between corporate and individual 
FCPA enforcement. 
C. The Problematic Surge in SEC Administrative Actions 
Prior FCPA year in reviews focused on NPAs and DPAs and the controversy 
associated with such alternative resolution vehicles.71  As highlighted in Table I, 
such resolution vehicles continued to be a prominent fixture of FCPA enforcement 
in 2014 and remain controversial.  However, the more notable issue from 2014 was 
the surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve alleged instances of FCPA 
scrutiny.  
Prior to discussing why this surge is problematic, some background information 
is necessary. SEC administrative actions in the FCPA context were rare prior to 
2010, largely because the SEC could not impose monetary penalties in such 
proceedings absent certain exceptions not relevant to FCPA enforcement. However, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act granted the SEC authority to impose civil 
monetary penalties in administrative proceedings in which the SEC staff seeks a 
cease-and-desist order.72  
Of further historical relevance to the recent surge of the SEC resolving most 
FCPA enforcement actions administratively, is that the SEC has had some notable 
struggles in recent years in the FCPA context and otherwise when put to its burden 
of proof in litigated actions or otherwise having to defend its settlement policies to 
federal court judges.73 The SEC’s response to this judicial scrutiny has been, as 
strange as it may sound, to bypass the judicial system altogether when resolving 
many of its enforcement actions including in the FCPA context.  
As noted by FCPA practitioners: 
“The use of administrative proceedings is noteworthy in an 
environment in which federal judges are increasingly questioning 
the merits of proposed settlements submitted by the SEC and 
 
at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law. 
71. See, Koehler, supra note 56. 
72. See, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P 
124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010). 
73. For instance, Judge Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) dismissed the SEC’s FCPA enforcement against 
former Siemens executive Herbert Steffen. In another FCPA enforcement action, Judge Keith 
Ellison (S.D.Tex.) granted without prejudice Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen’s motion to dismiss 
the SEC’s claims that sought monetary damages. In SEC v. Gabelli, the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the SEC’s statute of limitations position. In FCPA enforcement actions 
against Tyco and IBM, Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) expressed concerns regarding the terms of the 
SEC’s settlement and approved the settlements only after imposing additional reporting 
requirements on the companies. See Koehler, supra note 56. 
A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
167 
defendants for approval. . . . As judicial review continues to inject 
uncertainty into the once perfunctory settlement approval process, 
the use of administrative proceedings to resolve FCPA violations 
may become a preferred forum for SEC settlements.”74 
Use of administrative proceedings have indeed become the SEC’s preferred forum 
for resolving alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny. As Table II highlighted, of the 
seven SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2014, six (86%) were resolved 
through SEC administrative orders. 
This surge in administrative proceedings is problematic.  While Congress’s grant 
of such authority to the SEC in 2010 was no doubt politically popular in the 
aftermath of the so-called financial crisis, it has directly resulted in less judicial 
scrutiny of SEC enforcement theories including in the FCPA context.  In short, SEC 
administrative actions, not to mention SEC NPAs and DPAs, place the SEC in the 
role of regulator, prosecutor, judge and jury all at the same time. 
Criticism of the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings grew in 2014.  
For instance, Judge Jed Rakoff, a notable trial court judge who sits in the influential 
Southern District of New York and long a critic of the SEC’s neither admit nor deny 
settlement policy, questioned the SEC’s reliance on administrative proceedings by 
rhetorically asking in an unrelated order “from where does the constitutional 
warrant for such unchecked and unbalanced administrative power derive.”75 
Judge Rakoff followed-up more forcefully in a speech in which he asked — “is the 
SEC becoming a law unto itself?”76  In the speech Judge Rakoff discussed “some 
dangers that seem to lurk . . . in the SEC’s apparent new policy of bringing a greater 
percentage of its significant enforcement actions as administrative proceedings.”77 
In the words of Judge Rakoff: 
“What has been the stated rationale for all these changes? Usually 
nothing more than a claim of greater efficiency.” 
[…] 
While a claim to greater efficiency by any federal bureaucracy 
suggests a certain chutzpah, it is hard to find a better example of 
what is sometimes disparagingly called “administrative creep” than 
this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power. 
 
74. Paul R. Berger, et al., The Total S.A. Action: Are Administrative Orders the SEC’s FCPA Resolution 
of Choice for the Future?, 4 FCPA UPDATE 1, 2-3 (2013), available at http://documents.lexology.com/ 
2404f0e5-da6d-4bc2-bf04-c1980011e0db.pdf. 
75. Judge Rackoff Offers a Few Final Zingers, FRCP PROFESSOR (Aug. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/judge-rakoff-offers-a-few-final-zingers. 
76. Jed S. Rackoff, PLIA Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address: Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law 
Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://assets.law360news.com/0593000/593644/ 
Sec.Reg.Inst.final.pdf. 
77. Id. 
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To be sure, an S.E.C. enforcement action brought internally is in 
some superficial respects more “effective and efficient” and more 
“streamlined” than a similar action brought in federal court, for the 
simple reason that S.E.C. administrative proceedings involve much 
more limited discovery than federal actions, with no provision 
whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories. Similarly, at 
the hearing itself, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and 
the S.E.C. is free to introduce hearsay. Further still, there is no jury, 
and the matter is decided by an administrative law judge appointed 
and paid by the S.E.C. It is hardly surprising in these circumstances 
that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative hearings in 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% 
of its trials in federal court during the same period. 
But, although the informality and arguable unfairness of S.E.C. 
administrative proceedings might present serious problems for 
those defending such actions, you might suppose that federal judges 
would be delighted to have fewer complicated securities cases 
burdening their overcrowded dockets. The reason, though, that I 
suggest that the judiciary and the public should be concerned about 
any trend toward preferring the S.E.C.’s internal administrative 
forum to the federal courts is that it hinders the balanced 
development of the securities laws.” 
In conclusion, Judge Rakoff stated: 
“. . . I would urge the S.E.C. to consider that it is neither in its own 
longterm interest, nor in the interest of the securities markets, 
nor in the interest of the public as a whole, for the S.E.C. to become, 
in effect, a law onto itself.” 
Another vocal critic of the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings has 
been Russell Ryan, a former Assistant Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division).  
Ryan has noted: 
 “[A] surge in administrative [SEC] prosecutions should alarm 
anyone who values jury trials, due process and the constitutional 
separation of powers. The SEC often prefers to avoid judicial 
oversight and exploit the convenience of punishing alleged 
lawbreakers by administrative means, but doing so is 
unconstitutional. And if courts allow the SEC to get away with it, 
other executive-branch agencies are sure to follow.”78 
The irony of the SEC’s increased use of resolution vehicles that bypass the judicial 
system is that they have occurred during the tenure of Chair White.  As SEC Chair, 
White has extoled the virtue of trials and the adversarial system. For instance, in a 
speech titled “The Importance of Trials to the Law and Public Accountability,” White 
 
78. Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2014, 
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stated that trials “put our system of justice . . . on display for all to see” and observed: 
“The public airing of facts, literally in open court, creates 
accountability for both defendants and the government. How we 
resolve disputes and how we decide the guilt or innocence of an 
accused are the true measure of our democracy.”79 
In the speech, White noted that trials are the “‘crown jewel’ of our system of 
justice” and she focused on two “of the [more] important roles that trials play in our 
administration of justice: how they foster development of the law, and perhaps even 
more importantly how they create public accountability for both defendants and the 
government through the public airing of charges and evidence.” As to the former, 
White stated that “[t]rials allow for more thoughtful and nuanced interpretations of 
the law in a way that settlements and summary judgments cannot.”80 As to the later, 
White stated: 
“The death of trials would . . . remove a source of disciplined 
information about matters of public significance. . . . It would mean 
the end of an irreplaceable public forum and would mean that more 
of the legal order would proceed behind closed doors. And it would 
deprive us, as American citizens, of an important source of 
knowledge about ourselves and key issues of public concern.”81 
Notwithstanding the lack of accountability and adverse effects on the 
development of law that SEC Chair White has articulated, administrative actions 
have clearly become the preferred way for the SEC to resolve alleged instances of 
FCPA scrutiny.  Indeed, the SEC has vowed increased use of administrative 
proceedings to resolve FCPA enforcement actions82 and the SEC has generally 
rebutted criticisms of such proceedings by stating that the SEC’s “use of the 
administrative forum is eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to respondents.”83 
Many disagree and 2014 witnessed the beginning of constitutional challenges to the 
SEC’s use of the administrative process to resolve alleged violations of the securities 
law, an issue that will likely come into clearer focus in the years ahead.84 
 
79. Mary Jo White, Chair, 5th Annual Judge Thomas A. Flannery Lecture Washington D.C.,The 
Importance of Trials to the Law and Public Accountability (Nov. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540374908#.VPiytfnF-So. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-
138. 
83. Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement: Remarks to the American Bar 
Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297#.VMUlVkfF98E. 
84. Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over The Constitutionality of Some of Its Court 
Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2015, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-
challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-court-proceedings/?_r=0. 
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III. Other Top FCPA or Related Developments From 2014 
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related developments from 
2014.  Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) judicial scrutiny of FCPA 
enforcement agency theories including the first case of precedent regarding the 
FCPA’s important “foreign official” element; and (ii) judicial scrutiny of enforcement 
theories related to FCPA enforcement and how non-FCPA legal developments 
should cause pause as to certain FCPA enforcement theories. 
A. Judicial Scrutiny of FCPA Enforcement Theories 
Because of the resolution vehicles used by the DOJ and SEC to resolve FCPA 
enforcement actions, there is very little judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement. 
However, 2014 did witness two instances of judicial scrutiny and this section 
provides a comprehensive analysis of a historic “foreign official” appellate court 
decision as well as judicial scrutiny of a long-standing SEC enforcement action. 
1. “Foreign Official” 
In the FCPA’s approximate forty-year history there have been few judicial 
decisions of precedent.  Indeed, the number of substantive FCPA appellate court 
decisions can be counted on one hand.85 Thus, almost by definition, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Esquenazi, a case of first impression regarding 
the FCPA’s important “foreign official” element, was the top FCPA legal 
development of 2014.  Prior to discussing Esquenazi, some background information 
is necessary. 
At its relevant core, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offering or 
providing of anything of value to a “foreign official” in order to “obtain or retain 
business.”86 The FCPA defines “foreign official” as “any officer or employee of a 
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a 
public international organization.”87  
The proper scope and meaning of the “foreign official” element is an issue of 
extraordinary practical significance to businesses and individuals subject to the 
FCPA. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit certain business conduct with 
“foreign officials,” but do not apply to conduct that does not involve a “foreign 
official.”  Thus, it would not violate the FCPA to offer or provide something of value 
to a private customer, but offering or providing the same to a “foreign official” could 
 
85.  See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th 
Cir. 2004); United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2011). 
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998). 
87. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(2). 
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be a criminal FCPA violation.  Consequently, drawing the line between individuals 
who qualify as “foreign officials” and those who do not is critically important in a 
wide range of international business transactions. 
For most of the FCPA’s history the “foreign official” element presented little 
controversy as FCPA enforcement largely focused on payments to bona fide “foreign 
officials” such as political leaders and other foreign government regulatory officials 
such as tax and customs officials.88  However, in this new era of FCPA enforcement, 
the “foreign official” element has led to much dispute and controversy as many FCPA 
enforcement actions have nothing to do with such recipient categories. 
Rather, the alleged “foreign officials” in many FCPA enforcement actions are 
employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”). SOEs are 
generally profit seeking enterprises that have many attributes of private business 
such as publicly traded stock or other private investors.  In addition, many SOEs do 
business outside of their “home jurisdiction” in other countries and employ nationals 
and non-nationals alike.  Nevertheless, and not often transparent, a foreign 
government may hold an ownership interest in an SOE or exert some level of control 
(such as through appointment of directors or officers) over the business enterprise.  
Many of the world’s largest companies (often in the oil and gas industry) are 
considered SOEs and SOEs are found in most foreign countries and are most 
prevalent in certain Asian countries and the Middle East. 
The enforcement theory that has gained prominence is that SOEs are 
“instrumentalities” of a foreign government and that employees of alleged SOEs are 
thus “foreign officials” under the FCPA and occupy a status similar to political 
leaders. For instance, in 2014, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, 
in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs ranging from power and electric 
companies, to hospitals and labs, to an oil and gas company, to an aluminum 
smelter.89 
Against this backdrop, in 2011 a federal jury criminally convicted Joel Esquenazi 
and Carlos Rodriguez (former executives of Florida-based Terra 
 
88. See, e.g., Postage Stamps, Sir Albert Henry, Flying Voters, and the FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 
24, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/postage-stamps-sir-albert-henry-flying-voters-and-the-
fcpa.; Mike Koehler, Foreign Military Sales Leads To FCPA Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/foreign-military-sales-lead-to-fcpa-enforcement-
action. 
89. The “Foreign Officials” Of 2014, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
the-foreign-officials-of-2014. In 2013, 55% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in 
part, employees of alleged SOEs; in 2012, 42% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole 
or in part, employees of alleged SOEs; in 2011, 81% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in 
whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs; in 2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs; and in 2009, 66% of corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs. 
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Telecommunications Corp. (“Terra”)) on various counts for their alleged roles in a 
scheme to pay bribes to alleged “foreign officials” at Haiti Telecom, an alleged SOE.90  
On appeal, defendants challenged, among other things, the trial court’s “foreign 
official” jury instruction and an issue presented to the Eleventh Circuit was, 
“[w]hether [defendants are] entitled to an acquittal because employees of Haiti 
Teleco were not ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of FCPA simply because the 
National Bank of Haiti owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government 
appoints board members and directors.”91 
The appeal was historic in that it represented the first time in FCPA history in 
which an appellate court was presented the opportunity to scrutinize the prominent 
enforcement theory that employees of alleged SOEs are “foreign officials” under the 
FCPA. Because Esquenazi was a case of first impression, and given the previously 
highlighted prominence of the SOE “foreign official” theory as well as the general 
importance of the “foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, an 
extended discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is warranted. 
After summarizing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirming the defendants’ 
conviction in which the court defined the term “instrumentality” in the FCPA, the 
decision is next critically analyzed and the following issues will be discussed: (i) the 
Eleventh Circuit’s flawed legal reasoning; (ii) the practical compliance difficulties of 
applying the Eleventh Circuit’s “instrumentality” definition; and (iii) separating 
what was at issue in the Eleventh Circuit appeal vs. what was not at issue. 
To state the obvious, the Esquenazi decision was based on the unique facts of the 
case and the specific question presented of whether Haiti Teleco employees were 
“foreign officials” under the FCPA simply because the National Bank of Haiti 
allegedly owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government allegedly 
appointed board members and directors. 
As to the relevant factual background, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
One of Terra’s main vendors was [Haiti Teleco]. Because the 
relationship of Teleco to the Haitian government was, and remains, 
at issue in this case, the government presented evidence of Teleco’s 
ties to Haiti. Former Teleco Director of International Relations 
Robert Antoine testified that Teleco was owned by Haiti. An 
insurance broker, John Marsha, testified that, when Messrs. 
Rodriguez and Esquenazi were involved in previous contract 
negotiations with Teleco, they sought political-risk insurance, a type 
 
90. Press Release, Two Telecommunications Executives Convicted By Miami Jury on All Counts for 
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in 
Haiti, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 5, 2011),  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-crm-
1020.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2014). 
91. Historic “Foreign Official” Appeals Filed, FCPA Professor (May 10, 2012), 
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of coverage that applies only when a foreign government is party to 
an agreement. In emails with Mr. Marsha copied to Messrs. 
Esquenazi and Rodríguez, Mr. Dickey called Teleco an 
“instrumentality” of the Haitian government. 
An expert witness, Luis Gary Lissade, testified regarding Teleco’s 
history. At Teleco’s formation in 1968, the Haitian government gave 
the company a monopoly on telecommunication services. Teleco had 
significant tax advantages and, at its inception, the government 
appointed two members of Teleco’s board of directors. Haiti’s 
President appointed Teleco’s Director General, its top position, by 
an executive order that was also signed by the Haitian Prime 
Minister, the minister of public works, and the minister of economy 
and finance. In the early 1970s, the National Bank of Haiti gained 
97 percent ownership of Teleco. From that time forward, the Haitian 
President appointed all of Teleco’s board members. Sometime later, 
the National Bank of Haiti split into two separate entities, one of 
which was the Banque de la Republique d‘Haiti (BRH). BRH, the 
central bank of Haiti, is roughly equivalent to the United States 
Federal Reserve. BRH retained ownership of Teleco. In Mr. 
Lissade’s expert opinion, for the years relevant to this case, Teleco 
belonged “totally to the state” and “was considered . . . a public 
entity.” 
Mr. Lissade also testified that Teleco’s business entity suffix, 
S.A.M., indicates “associate anonymous mixed,” which means the 
“Government put money in the corporation.” Teleco’s suffix was 
attached not by statute, but “de facto” because “the government 
consider[ed] Teleco as its . . . entity.” In 1996, Haiti passed a 
“modernization” law, seeking to privatize many public institutions. 
As a result, Haiti privatized Teleco sometime between 2009 and 
2010. Ultimately, Mr. Lissade opined that, during the years 
relevant to this case, “Teleco was part of the public administration.” 
He explained: “There was no specific law that . . . decided that at the 
beginning that Teleco is a public entity but government, officials, 
everyone consider[ed] Teleco as a public administration.” And, he 
said, “if there was a doubt whatsoever, the [anti-corruption] law 
[that] came in 2008 vanish[ed] completely this doubt . . . by citing 
Teleco as a public administration” and by requiring its agents — 
whom Mr. Lissade said were public agents — to declare all assets to 
avoid secret bribes.92 
Based on the above circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Haiti 
Teleco “would qualify as a Haitian instrumentality under almost any definition [the 
court] could craft,” and that the Haiti Teleco employees allegedly bribed were thus 
“foreign officials” under the FCPA.93  Elsewhere, the court stated that it had “little 
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difficulty concluding sufficient evidence supported the jury’s necessary finding that 
Teleco was a Haitian instrumentality.”94 
The Eleventh Circuit could have rendered its decision on this narrow issue.  
However, “mindful of the needs of both corporations and the government for [future] 
direction about what an instrumentality is,”95 the Eleventh Circuit went further and 
attempted to define “instrumentality” as found in the FCPA.  For starters, the 
Eleventh Circuit rightly acknowledged that: 
“The FCPA does not define the term “instrumentality,” and this 
Court has not either. For that matter, we know of no other court of 
appeals who has.”96 
The Eleventh Circuit’s statutory analysis next proceeded as follows: 
“We begin, as we always do when construing statutory text, with the 
plain meaning of the word at issue.  According to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, an instrumentality is ‘[a] means or agency through 
which a function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch 
of a governing body.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
says the word means ‘something that serves as an intermediary or 
agent through which one or more functions of a controlling force are 
carried out: a part, organ, or subsidiary branch esp. of a governing 
body.’ These dictionary definitions foreclose Mr. Rodriguez’s 
contention that only an actual part of the government would qualify 
as an instrumentality—that contention is too cramped and would 
impede the ‘wide net over foreign bribery’ Congress sought to cast 
in enacting the FCPA.”97 
The Eleventh Circuit next observed that “dictionary definitions” did not 
completely provide the answer to what is an “instrumentality” and the court next 
“turn[ed] to other tools to decide what ‘instrumentality’ means in the FCPA.”98  The 
court stated: 
“In the FCPA, the company ‘instrumentality’ keeps is ‘agency’ and 
‘department,’ entities through which the government performs its 
functions and that are controlled by the government. We therefore 
glean from that context that an entity must be under the control or 
dominion of the government to qualify as an ‘instrumentality’ 
within the FCPA’s meaning. And we can also surmise from the other 
words in the series along with ‘instrumentality’ that an 
instrumentality must be doing the business of the government. 
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What the defendants and the government disagree about, however, 
is what functions count as the government’s business. 
To answer that question, we examine the broader statutory context 
in which the word is used.  In this respect, we find one other 
provision of the FCPA and Congress’s relatively recent amendment 
of the statute particularly illustrative. First, the so-called ‘grease 
payment’ provision establishes an ‘exception’ to FCPA liability for 
‘any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official . . . the 
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a 
routine governmental action by a foreign official.’  ‘Routine 
governmental action’ is defined as ‘an action . . . ordinarily and 
commonly performed by a foreign official in,’ among other things, 
‘providing phone service.’ If an entity involved in providing phone 
service could never be a foreign official so as to fall under the FCPA’s 
substantive prohibition, there would be no need to provide an 
express exclusion for payments to such an entity. In other words, if 
we read ‘instrumentality,’ as the defendants urge, to categorically 
exclude government-controlled entities that provide telephone 
service, like Teleco, then we would render meaningless a portion of 
the definition of ‘routine governmental action.’ […] ‘It is a cardinal 
rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if 
possible, be accorded to every word.’ Thus, that a government-
controlled entity provides a commercial service does not 
automatically mean it is not an instrumentality. In fact, the statute 
expressly contemplates that in some instances it would. 
Next, we turn to Congress’s 1998 amendment of the FCPA, enacted 
to ensure the United States was in compliance with its treaty 
obligations. That year, the United States ratified the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (OECD Convention).  In joining the OECD 
Convention, the United States agreed to ‘take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under 
[United States] law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or 
give . . . directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official 
. . . in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to 
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.’ ‘Foreign public official’ is defined to include 
‘any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, 
including for a . . . public enterprise.’ The commentaries to the 
OECD Convention explain that: ‘A “public enterprise” is any 
enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a government, or 
governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a dominant 
influence.’  The commentary further explains: ‘An official of a public 
enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the 
enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in the relevant 
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market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to that of a 
private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other 
privileges.’ In addition to this, the OECD Convention also requires 
signatories make it a crime to pay bribes to agents of any ‘public 
international organization.’ 
To implement the Convention’s mandates, Congress amended the 
FCPA in 1998. The only change to the definition of ‘foreign official’ 
in the FCPA that Congress thought necessary was the addition of 
‘public international organization.’ This seems to demonstrate that 
Congress considered its preexisting definition already to cover a 
‘foreign public official’ of an ‘enterprise . . . over which a government 
. . . exercise[s] a dominant influence’ that performs a ‘public function’ 
because it does not ‘operate[] on a normal commercial basis . . . 
substantially equivalent to that of . . . private enterprise[s]’ in the 
relevant market ‘without preferential subsidies or other privileges.’ 
Although we generally are wary of relying too much on later 
legislative developments to decide a prior Congress’ legislative 
intent, the circumstances in this case cause us less concern in that 
regard. This is not an instance in which Congress merely discussed 
previously enacted legislation and possible changes to it. Rather, 
Congress did make a change to the FCPA, and it did so specifically 
to ensure that the FCPA fulfilled the promise the United States 
made to other nations when it joined the Convention. The FCPA 
after those amendments is a different law, and we may consider 
Congress’s intent in passing those amendments as strongly 
suggestive of the meaning of “instrumentality” as it exists today. 
[…] 
[S]ince the beginning of the republic, the Supreme Court has 
explained that construing federal statutes in such a way to ensure 
the United States is in compliance with the international 
obligations it voluntarily has undertaken is of paramount 
importance. ‘If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of 
international accords and have a role as a trusted partner in 
multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before 
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate 
international agreements.’  We are thus constrained to interpret 
‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA so as to reach the types of officials 
the United States agreed to stop domestic interests from bribing 
when it ratified the OECD Convention.”99 
Based on the above analysis and rationale, the Eleventh Circuit articulated the 
below key language from the decision. 
“An ‘instrumentality’ [under the FCPA] is an entity controlled by 
the government of a foreign country that performs a function the 
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A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
177 
controlling government treats as its own. Certainly, what 
constitutes control and what constitutes a function the government 
treats as its own are fact-bound questions. It would be unwise and 
likely impossible to exhaustively answer them in the abstract. 
Because we only have this case before us, we do not purport to list 
all of the factors that might prove relevant to deciding whether an 
entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government. For today, we 
provide a list of some factors that may be relevant to deciding the 
issue. 
To decide if the government ‘controls’ an entity, courts and juries 
should look to the foreign government’s formal designation of that 
entity; whether the government has a majority interest in the 
entity; the government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s 
principals; the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly 
into the governmental fisc, and, by the same token, the extent to 
which the government funds the entity if it fails to break even; and 
the length of time these indicia have existed. 
[…] 
We then turn to the second element relevant to deciding if an entity 
is an instrumentality of a foreign government under the FCPA — 
deciding if the entity performs a function the government treats as 
its own. Courts and juries should examine whether the entity has a 
monopoly over the function it exists to carry out; whether the 
government subsidizes the costs associated with the entity 
providing services; whether the entity provides services to the public 
at large in the foreign country; and whether the public and the 
government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to 
be performing a governmental function.”100 
With a comprehensive summary of the Esquenazi decision complete, a critical 
analysis of the decision of first impression is next warranted and the following issues 
are discussed: (i) the Eleventh Circuit’s flawed legal reasoning; (ii) the practical 
compliance difficulties of applying the Eleventh Circuit’s “instrumentality” 
definition; and (iii) separating what was at issue in the Eleventh Circuit appeal vs. 
what was not at issue. 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Flawed Legal Reasoning 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was flawed in at least two respects.101 First, 
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contrary to the court’s opinion, the FCPA’s enacting legislative history indicates that 
Congress did not intend the term “foreign official” to include employees of SOEs. 
Second, instead of considering the relevant enacting FCPA legislative history, the 
Eleventh Circuit supported its conclusion with a flawed analysis of subsequent 1998 
amendments to the FCPA. 
As to the first flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the FCPA’s extensive 
enacting legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the “foreign 
official” element to include employees of SOEs. Enacted in 1977, the FCPA was the 
end result of more than two years of investigation and consideration by both the 
94th and 95th Congresses of the so-called “foreign corporate payments problem.” 
Between June 1975 and September 1977, approximately twenty different bills were 
introduced in the Senate or House to address the foreign payments issue, and 
Congress held numerous hearings during which representatives from DOJ, SEC, 
State Department, Defense Department, Commerce Department, and Treasury 
Department testified.102  
During its investigation and consideration of the foreign payments issue, 
Congress learned of a wide variety of payments to a broad range of recipients.103 But 
instead of enacting a general anti-bribery statute that would have applied to 
payments made to both public officials and private parties, Congress chose to enact 
a more limited law and accepted that the FCPA would “not reach all corrupt 
payments overseas.”104 In short, Congress used the “foreign official” element of the 
FCPA to limit the reach of the statute and if an alleged payment scheme does not 
involve a “foreign official,” no violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can 
occur. 
Statements, events, and information in the legislative history indicate Congress’s 
intent to exclude employees of SOEs from the definition of “foreign official.” For 
instance, the payments that prompted Congressional scrutiny principally involved 
traditional foreign government officials such as the Prime Minister of Japan; the 
Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces; the husband of the Queen of the 
Netherlands; the President of Honduras; the President of Gabon; and Saudi Arabian 
military generals.105 It was these types of payments — and the foreign policy issues 
 
102. See Decl. of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One 
Through Ten of the Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) 
(summarizing the bills and hearings which led to enactment of the FCPA). 
103. See, e.g., SEC Rept., Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (May 12, 1976); 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fin., H.R. 6118, 95th Congr., 1st Sess. 
(Apr. 20 & 21, 1977). 
104. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 11 (Dec. 7, 1977) as to S. 305 (May 2, 1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 
(Sept. 28, 1977) as to H.R. 3815 (Feb. 22, 1977). 
105. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations, United States Senate, 94th 
Congr., 1st Sess. (May 16 & 19; June 9 & 10; July 16 & 17; and Sept. 12, 1975) (“Political 
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they created — that motivated Congress to pass the FCPA in 1977.106  
During its multi-year investigation and deliberation, Congress clearly was aware 
that SOEs existed and that some of the foreign payments may have involved 
employees of such enterprises. Indeed, some of the bills introduced to address the 
foreign payments issue in the Senate and the House during both the 94th and 95th 
Congresses included definitions of “foreign government” that expressly included 
SOEs.  
However, none of those bills became law. For instance, in August 1976, S. 3741 
was introduced in the Senate, and H.R. 15149 was introduced in the House. Both 
bills defined “foreign government” to include, among other things, “a corporation or 
other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control by, a foreign 
government.”107 Similarly, in June 1977, H.R. 7543 was introduced in the House and 
defined “foreign government” to include “a corporation or other legal entity 
established, owned, or subject to managerial control by a foreign government.”108 The 
above-quoted language from S. 3741 and H.R. 15149 provoked a comment from an 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) committee, which informed Congress that the 
definition of “foreign government” in these bills was “somewhat ambiguous.”109 The 
ABA committee suggested a “more precise definition of this aspect of the definition 
of ‘foreign government’” and proposed the following language: “a legal entity which 
a foreign government owns or controls as though an owner.”110 
Even though Congress was obviously aware of SOEs and even though language 
in other bills addressing foreign payments expressly included SOEs, Congress chose 
not to include these definitions or concepts in the bill that ultimately became the 
FCPA in December 1977. In short, in enacting the FCPA, Congress specifically 
contemplated — but rejected — statutory language that would have included SOEs. 
Indeed, by rejecting the definitions that appeared in S. 3741 and H.R. 15149, 
Congress rejected the very ownership-and-control test the Eleventh Circuit 
articulated in Esquenazi to determine when individuals employed by SOEs may be 
 
Contributions to Foreign Governments Hearings”); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International 
Economic Policy, H.R., 94th Congr., 1st Sess. (June 5, July 17, 24, & 29, Sept. 11, 18, & 30, 1975). 
106. See, e.g., Political Contributions to Foreign Governments Hearings at 1 (“This subcommittee is 
concerned with the foreign policy consequences of these payments by U.S. based multinational 
corporations. . . . It is time to treat the issue for what it is: a serious foreign policy problem.”); 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 
2nd  Sess. at 139 (Sept. 21 & 22, 1976) (“Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearing…problem with 
corporate bribery overseas is that it poses very significant problems for our own foreign policy”). 
107. S. 3741, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 6, 1976); H.R. 15149, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 10, 1976). 
108. H.R. 7543,,95th Cong., 1st Sess.  (June 1, 1977). 
109. H.R. 15149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings (containing a Sept. 22, 
1976 letter from the American Bar Association to Rep. John Murphy, Chairman of the House 
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fin.). 
110. Id. 
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considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA. 
The second flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was that instead of considering 
the relevant enacting FCPA legislative history, the court supported its conclusion 
with a flawed analysis of subsequent 1998 amendments to the FCPA. 
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it was “wary of relying too much on later 
legislative developments to decide a prior Congress’ legislative intent” and 
specifically cited a prior Supreme Court warning that “the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”111 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the legislative history of the 
1998 amendments to the FCPA—passed more than twenty years after enactment of 
the FCPA—to determine the meaning of critical terms that have always appeared 
in the FCPA. Even assuming post-enactment legislative history could theoretically 
be relevant to the issue presented in Esquenazi, the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on 
the 1998 amendments was nevertheless flawed in at least two respects.  
First, the 1998 amendments did not modify or address the component of the 
FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” at issue in the case. Prior to the FCPA’s 1998 
amendments, the FCPA defined “foreign official” in pertinent part as: 
“[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person 
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government 
or department, agency, or instrumentality . . .”112 
The 1998 amendments to the FCPA modified that definition as follows: 
“any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on 
behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international 
organization.”113 
As highlighted by the italicized text, the FCPA’s 1998 amendments added 
unrelated language to make it clear that public international organizations were 
within the FCPA’s scope. The amendments did not modify the “foreign official” 
definition in any way that was relevant to the question presented to the Eleventh 
Circuit. 
Second, the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded that the FCPA’s 1998 
amendments fully conformed the FCPA to the OECD Convention. Having so 
concluded, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the FCPA’s “foreign official” element 
 
111. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). 
112. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1418. 
113. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 3, 112 Stat. 
3302, 3305 (emphasis added). 
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must include employees of SOEs because the OECD Convention’s “foreign public 
official” definition can include employees of a “public enterprise” under certain 
circumstances.114 
However, the 1998 Amendments to the FCPA were not intended to and did not 
bring the FCPA into complete conformity with the OECD Convention. When it 
passed the 1998 amendments, Congress understood that, while the OECD 
Convention approximated the FCPA, the two were not identical. During 
Congressional hearings that led to the 1998 amendments, the OECD Convention 
was described as “closely model[ing]” the FCPA, being “very similar” to the FCPA; 
being “largely consistent” with the FCPA; and tracking the FCPA closely.115 None of 
those statements demonstrate Congress’s intent to establish complete conformity 
between the OECD Convention and the FCPA. 
Regardless of Congress’s intent, as the Fifth Circuit previously stated in an 
unrelated FCPA decision, the OECD Convention and the FCPA, as modified by the 
1998 amendments, remain different in significant respects.116 
The erroneous assumption of equivalence between the OECD Convention and the 
FCPA is a critical flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. Based on that false 
premise, the court inferred that Congress “considered its preexisting definition [of 
‘foreign official’] already to cover” employees of SOEs. After all, the Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned, if the 1998 amendments were designed to conform the FCPA to the OECD 
Convention, and if the 1998 amendments did not modify the relevant portions of the 
definition of “foreign official,” then the definition of “foreign official” must have 
already conformed to the OECD Convention definition.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning finds support in neither the FCPA’s 
enacting legislative history, the legislative history relevant to the 1998 
amendments, nor accepted norms of statutory construction. Indeed, the Supreme 
 
114. The OECD Convention’s inclusion of “public enterprise” in the definition of “foreign public official” 
is specifically qualified through Commentary 15 to the OECD Convention, which states, “An official 
of a public enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the enterprise operates 
on a normal commercial basis in the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially 
equivalent to that of a private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other privileges.” 
OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions cmt. 15, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, 9. [hereinafter OECD Combating Bribery 
Convention] 
115. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4353 Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. And Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 5, 10-11 
(1998). 
116. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 754. For instance: (i) while the FCPA contains an express statutory exception 
for facilitating payments, the OECD Convention does not; (ii) while the FCPA prohibits certain 
corrupt payments to political parties, the OECD Convention does not; and (iii) while the FCPA 
requires that corrupt payments be for the purpose of “obtain[ing] or retain[ing] business,” the OECD 
Convention contains no such requirement. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b), -2(a) (1998), with the 
OECD Combating Bribery Convention, supra note 115. 
14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2016) 
182 
Court has warned against divining legislative intent from Congress’s inaction.117 
Furthermore, international agreements like the OECD Convention— which is not 
self-executing—may be given legal effect only insofar as Congress separately enacts 
legislation to implement them.118  
In short, the scope of a key element of a top-priority federal criminal statute that 
applies to countless businesses and individuals engaged in international commerce 
should be determined by ordinary tools of statutory construction and not, as the 
Eleventh Circuit did, through a flawed legal analysis or a process of inference based 
on mistaken assumptions about a non-self-executing international agreement.  
The above features of the Eleventh Circuit’s Esquenazi decision were problematic 
itself, yet another problem with the court’s “instrumentality” definition is the 
practical compliance difficulties that will result. 
2. The Practical Compliance Difficulties of Applying the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s “Instrumentality” Definition 
To review, the key holding of the Esquenazi decision was that an 
“instrumentality” under the FCPA is an “entity controlled by the government of a 
foreign country that performs a function the controlling government treats as its 
own.”119 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that what “constitutes control and what 
constitutes a function the government treats as its own are fact-bound questions” 
and, without seeking to list all “factors that might prove relevant,” the court did list 
“some factors that may be relevant” in deciding issues of control and function.120 
As to control, the Eleventh Circuit listed the following factors:  
[T]he foreign government’s formal designation of that entity; 
whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; the 
government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s principals; the 
extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into the 
governmental fisc, and, by the same token, the extent to which the 
government funds the entity if it fails to break even; and the length 
of time these indicia have existed.121 
As to function:  
[W]hether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to 
carry out; whether the government subsidizes the costs associated 
with the entity providing services; whether the entity provides 
 
117. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002). 
118. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2013) (a convention that is not self-executing “does 
not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law” absent “implementing legislation 
passed by Congress” (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008))). 
119. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 925. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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services to the public at large in the foreign country; and whether 
the public and the government of that foreign country generally 
perceive the entity to be performing a governmental function.122 
The Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive and often vague factors as to the meaning 
of “instrumentality” present practical compliance difficulties for business 
organizations and individuals competing in good faith in the global marketplace.  In 
short, those subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions will have difficulty in 
finding answers to many of the factor-based questions. 
The Eleventh Circuit apparently thought such answers would be easy to ascertain 
and stated: 
We think it will be relatively easy to decide what functions a 
government treats as its own in the present tense by resort to 
objective factors, like control, exclusivity, governmental authority to 
hire and fire, subsidization, and whether an entity’s finances are 
treated as part of the public fisc.  Both courts and businesses subject 
to the FCPA have readily at hand the tools to conduct that inquiry 
(especially because the statute contains a mechanism by which the 
Attorney General will render opinions on requests about what 
foreign entities constitute instrumentalities [the so-called FCPA 
Opinion Procedure Release Program].123 
Once again however, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning was flawed.  It is difficult 
to envision how a general counsel or chief compliance officer of a company, charged 
with approving expenditures of things of value made in connection with a business 
purpose, will find answers to certain issues identified by the Eleventh Circuit as 
being relevant. 
Does the Eleventh Circuit envision the following exchanges? 
• General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer:  Pardon me 
individual at Company A, can you tell me how your principals 
are hired and fired? 
• General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer:  Excuse me 
individual at Company B, but do your profits go directly into the 
government fisc?  Does the government subsidize your 
operations?  And if so, for how long? 
• General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer:  By the way 
individual at Company C, does the public in your country 
generally perceive your company to be performing a 
governmental function? 
As to the practical compliance challenges resulting from the Eleventh Circuit’s 
“instrumentality” definition, FCPA practitioners have noted: 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 925 n.8. 
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In practice, this analysis may be more difficult than the court allows 
because information on these factors is not always publicly available 
or easy to discern.124 
The boundaries between public and private entities are often 
blurred, particularly in developing countries where corruption risks 
are the target of heightened Justice Department scrutiny.125  
As companies long have known, it can be expensive and time 
consuming to make such determinations, particularly in countries 
such as Russia, China, and various countries in Central and Latin 
America and in Africa where information about companies and state 
ownership is less than transparent and objective.126 
Ten years ago, I would have been happy to bet anyone a doughnut 
that I could accurately define what a foreign official is. Now, with 
various court definitions and a lack of clarity from the DOJ, I fear I 
might actually lose my doughnut.127 
An irony of the Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive, factor-based test for what 
constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA is that the court itself recognized 
that it will be a “difficult task—involving divining the subjective intentions of a 
foreign sovereign, parsing history, and interpreting significant amounts of foreign 
law—to decide what functions a foreign government considers core and 
traditional.”128  Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit recognized “there may be entities 
near the definitional line for ‘instrumentality’ that may raise a vagueness 
concern.”129 
A further irony of the Eleventh Circuit’s factor-based test which resorts to foreign 
government categorization and characterization of business enterprises is that the 
DOJ itself has rejected such an approach in issuing opinions under the FCPA 
Opinion Procedure Release Program. For instance, in Release 94-01 a company 
subject to the FCPA disclosed that its “foreign attorney has advised that under the 
 
124. M. Witten et al., Eleventh Circuit Adopts Broad Definition of Government “Instrumentality” Under 
FCPA, WILMER HALE (May 22, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnews 
detail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179872427. 
125. Wendy Wysong et al., Eleventh Circuit Issues Much Anticipated Opinion Defining ‘Foreign Official’ 
Under FCPA, CLIFFORD CHANCE 1, 3 (May 20, 2014), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/ 
05/eleventh_circuitissuesmuchanticipatedopinio.html#.U30GwfldWiM. 
126. Sean Hecker et al., FCPA Update: U.S. Appellate Court Defines Government “Instrumentality” 
Under FCPA, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP 1, 7 (May 2014), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/ 
files/insights/publications/2014/05/fcpa%20update/files/view%20fcpa%20update/fileattachment/fcp
a_update_may2014.pdf. 
127. Tom Webb, FCPA Enforcement Critic to Become DoJ Fraud Section Chief, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 
REVIEW (Jan. 13, 2015), http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/2277/?utm_source= 
Law+Business+Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=5232111_GIR+Headlines&utm_
content=$LINK_KEYWORD$&dm_i=1KSF,3454F,E9U8QV,B628O,1. 
128. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 925, n.8. 
129. Id. at 929. 
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nation’s law, the individual [at issue] would not be regarded as either a government 
employee or a public official . . . .”130  However, the DOJ stated that “the foreign 
attorney’s opinion is not dispositive” and the DOJ “considered the foreign individual 
to be a ‘foreign official’ under the [FCPA].”131 
As to the FCPA’s Opinion Procedure Release Program referenced by the Eleventh 
Circuit, seemingly lost on the court is that it often takes months for a business 
organization to receive an answer from the DOJ.  For this reason, among others, the 
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release Program has been routinely criticized.  As noted 
in a 2010 review of FCPA enforcement by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions: 
So far, the FCPA Opinion Procedure has been used very little by the 
private sector to obtain DOJ advice on prospective transactions . . . 
The non-governmental participants in the on-site meetings cited 
several reasons for the infrequent use of the Opinion Procedure. For 
instance, legal and private sector representatives felt that the 
Opinion Procedure is only useful in limited situations where the 
prospective fact situation is narrow and not going to change. They 
also find that the response time, which is 30 days after the request 
is complete, is too long in certain situations, such as entering joint 
ventures and mergers and acquisitions, where a company normally 
needs to make decisions relatively quickly . . . The most pervasive 
concern of the private sector representatives was that availing 
themselves of the Opinion Procedure could expose them to potential 
enforcement actions by the DOJ, as well as provide competitors with 
information about their prospective international business 
activities.132 
In short, the Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive and often vague factors as to the 
meaning of “instrumentality” present practical compliance difficulties for business 
organizations and individuals competing in good faith in the global marketplace. 
Moreover, as even the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, its factor-based test may 
raise constitutional vagueness questions.  Indeed, by largely deferring to foreign 
government categorization and characterization of business enterprises, the 
Eleventh Circuit crafted an “instrumentality” definition with 193 potential different 
meanings.133 
 
130. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review: Opinion Procedure Release, No. 94-01, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (May 13, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
opinion/1994/9401.pdf. 
131. Id. 
132. Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States, 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 29 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf. 
133. By most measures, there are 193 countries in the world. 
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Such a test as to a key element of an important criminal law raises several 
significant constitutional issues “because it vests domestic federal lawmaking in 
foreign governments and their officials.”134 Among other practical problems for those 
subject to the FCPA is that finding foreign law may be difficult, and foreign 
government agencies or departments may have rulemaking power but may not 
publish rules in English.135 
In closing, the Eleventh Circuit’s Esquenazi decision of first impression regarding 
the FCPA’s important “foreign official” element was the top legal development of 
2014. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit’s legal reasoning 
was flawed and its non-exhaustive, factor- based test presents several practical 
compliance difficulties. 
Some commentators appeared perplexed why the meaning of “foreign official” in 
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions even matters.  As stated by one commentator: 
If your [sic] trying to figure out whether a company is a private 
company or an “instrumentality” of a foreign government under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act you are already in trouble. To reach 
that point in the FCPA analysis you’ve already paid a bribe, or are 
thinking of paying a bribe. (If you’re just thinking about it; Don’t do 
it.) Otherwise you’ll end up in the position of Joel Esquenazi and 
Carlos Rodriguez.136 
Such comments are entirely off-base and not the main reason why the meaning 
of “foreign official” matters. To be sure, the meaning of “foreign official” mattered to 
Esquenazi and Rodriguez in the narrow context of their case and more broadly for 
the obvious rule of law reasons implicated in criminal law enforcement. 
Stating that the meaning of “foreign official” matters only to those intent on 
engaging in bribery is like saying the drinking laws matter only to those intent on 
drunk driving.  Sure, the drinking laws can certainly capture those engaged in drunk 
driving, yet the reality is the underlying activity—drinking—is legal and socially 
acceptable in most other situations. 
The same is true when it comes to the meaning of “foreign official.” The FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions are generally implicated when anything of value is offered or 
provided to a “foreign official” in connection with a business purpose.  Often the 
underlying activity—offering or providing anything of value in connection with a 
business purpose—is legal and socially acceptable in most situations.  In fact, it is 
often called effective sales and marketing, wining and dining the customer, or 
 
134. Paul J Larkin Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the Constitutional Regulation of 
Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  337, 346 (2015). 
135. Id. 
136. Doug Cornelius, What is an “Instrumentality” under the FCPA, COMPLIANCE BLDG., (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2014/05/21/what-is-an-instrumentality-under-the-fcpa/. 
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maintaining good will.  In other words, those competing in good faith in the global 
marketplace can legally provide anything of value to one category of person in 
connection with a business purpose, yet providing the same thing of value to a 
different category of person can be a crime.  
In short, the Esquenazi decision expands regulation of business interactions with 
a “well-defined group of persons” (as correctly noted by the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. 
Castle137) to an ill-defined, practically boundless category of persons. Finally, in 
analyzing Esquenazi it is also important to understand what was not at issue before 
the Eleventh Circuit and what was at issue. 
3. What Was At Issue in the Eleventh Circuit Appeal vs. What Was Not at 
Issue 
What was not at issue in Esquenazi was whether the FCPA should incorporate 
SOE concepts. Indeed, if Congress wants to include SOEs in the FCPA, as it has in 
other laws passed before and after the FCPA, or wants to align the FCPA with the 
OECD Convention on the “foreign official” issue, Congress is clearly capable of doing 
just that. 
Both before and after enactment of the FCPA, Congress has demonstrated its 
ability to draft and enact bills that expressly address SOEs and related concepts and 
it is axiomatic that when a particular term is explicitly included in other statutes, 
but is not included in the statute at issue, courts should presume that Congress did 
not intend to include that term in the statute at issue.138  
Congress has repeatedly enacted statutory definitions that expressly include 
SOEs, but the definition included in the FCPA does not.  Under such circumstances, 
the absence of any mention of SOEs in the FCPA indicates Congress’s intent that 
employees of SOEs do not fall within the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official.”  
Indeed, if the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FCPA’s statutory language 
were correct, the express references to SOEs that appear in other statutes would be 
rendered entirely superfluous. 
For instance, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) passed by Congress 
in 1976 (one year before the FCPA) expressly provides the following definition: 
(a) “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign 
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in 
subsection (b). 
 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1991).   The Castle court’s statement 
was dicta and the court did not substantively address the meaning of the FCPA’s “foreign official” 
element. 
138. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005). 
14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2016) 
188 
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any 
entity—(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, 
and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) 
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor 
created under the laws of any third country.”139 
Likewise, the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) passed by Congress in 1996 
regulates certain conduct that “will benefit any foreign government, foreign 
instrumentality, or foreign agent” and expressly provides the following definition: 
“[F]oreign instrumentality” means any agency, bureau, ministry, 
component, institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or 
business organization, corporation, firm, or entity that is 
substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, 
or dominated by a foreign government.140 
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”), passed by Congress in 2010, required certain resource extraction 
companies to disclose information regarding payments for development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals made to “foreign governments.” The law expressly includes 
the following definition of “foreign government”: 
[T]he term “foreign government” means a foreign government, a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or 
a company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the 
Commission.141 
The quoted language of the above statutes, which expressly includes SOEs, would 
be rendered surplusage if the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FCPA were 
correct. Of course, courts hesitate to adopt constructions of statutes that render 
language unnecessary or inoperative and it is a “well-settled rule that all parts of a 
statute, if possible, are to be given effect,”142 and courts are “reluctant to treat 
statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.”143 
What was also not at issue in Esquenazi was whether the FCPA should be a 
comprehensive anti-bribery statute. Congress could have passed a comprehensive 
anti-bribery statute in 1977—as well as when the FCPA was amended in 1988 and 
1998—and could still pass a comprehensive anti-bribery statute today if it chooses.  
However, it is undisputed that Congress has not done so and the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions are qualified in many ways such as through the category of recipients of 
 
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2013) (emphasis added). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1) (2013) (emphasis added). 
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(B) (2014) (emphasis added). 
142. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981). 
143. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
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the alleged improper payments. 
Indeed, should it choose, Congress could easily look to anti-corruption legislation 
enacted by several other OECD Convention signatory countries which expressly 
include SOEs and related concepts.  For instance, the United Kingdom “Bribery Act” 
defines “foreign public official” to expressly include individuals who exercise a public 
function for any “public enterprise.”144 Similarly, Canada’s “Corruption of Foreign 
Public Officials Act” defines “foreign public official” to expressly include a person 
who performs public duties or functions for a foreign state, including a person 
employed by a “corporation.”145 Likewise, the relevant provisions of Australia’s 
Criminal Code Act expressly state that “foreign government body” includes “a 
foreign public enterprise,” and the Act then contains a detailed definition of “foreign 
public enterprise.”146  
What was at issue in Esquenazi was the basic and fundamental principle of 
ensuring that when the government marshals its full resources against individuals 
and deprives the individuals of their liberty, each element of the charge alleged is 
being applied consistent with Congressional intent in enacting the statute.  After 
all, the DOJ (and SEC) should only enforce an FCPA statute that Congress actually 
intended to enact. 
Notwithstanding what was at issue in Esquenazi, some have suggested: 
For those who challenged the government’s legal interpretation of 
the term “instrumentality,” they need to pick and choose better 
places to challenge the FCPA and the government’s enforcement 
program.147 
Such commentary wholly discounts the ultimate outcome of other FCPA 
enforcement actions in which other individual defendants challenged, at the trial 
court level, the DOJ’s legal interpretation that SOE employees were “foreign 
officials” under the FCPA.  For instance: 
• A federal court judge granted, at the close of the DOJ’s case, 
John O’Shea’s motion for acquittal and found him not guilty of 
all substantive FCPA charges.148  O’Shea’s lawyers opined that 
 
144. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, art. 6 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/ 
contents (emphasis added). 
145. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c 34, art 2 (Can.), available at http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-45.2/page-1.html (emphasis added). 
146. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 70 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/ 
C2014C00196 (emphasis added). 
147. Michael Volkov, Esquenazi: DOJ Wins Appeal on Instrumentality, VOLKOV LAW GROUP LLC (May 
19, 2014), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2014/05/esquenazi-doj-wins-appeal-on-instrumentality/. 
148. O’Shea Not Guilty of Substantive FCPA Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/oshea-not-guilty-of-substantive-fcpa-charges. 
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the “foreign official” issue played a role in the ultimate outcome 
of the case.149 
• In the Carson “foreign official” challenge, the judge issued a pro-
defendant jury instruction prior to trial concerning “knowledge 
of status of foreign official.”150  Soon thereafter, the DOJ offered 
the defendants what can only be described as lenient plea deals 
that the risk adverse defendants accepted and the DOJ never 
had to prove its case.151 
• In the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action, the judge 
ultimately dismissed the case after finding numerous instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct.152  Although the prosecutorial 
misconduct was seemingly unconnected to “foreign official” 
issues, post-trial motions concerning “foreign official” issues 
were pending at the time of dismissal. 
Given the dearth of FCPA precedent and the importance of the “foreign official” 
issue, the Esquenazi decision generated much commentary.  In the minds of some, 
the decision of first impression “puts to rest a major issue of contention” concerning 
the proper meaning of “foreign official.”153  Others stated that the Esquenazi decision 
“would appear to curtail the on-going debate over what constitutes a government 
instrumentality and whether improper payments to state-owned entities could be a 
violation of the FCPA.”154 
Such commentary is curious as it is doubtful that there is another instance in 
which a key element of an important federal law is deemed resolved or settled 
because of one appellate court decision, not to mention a flawed decision. 
 
149. Did “Foreign Official” Impact The O’Shea Acquittal, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jul. 11, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/did-foreign-official-impact-the-oshea-acquittal. 
150. Checking In On the Carson Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
checking-in-on-the-carson-case-2. 
151. Carson Sentencing Issues, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/carson-
sentencing-issues; Friday Roundup, FCPA Professor (Feb 1, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
friday-roundup-67. 
152. See Milestone Erased: Judge Matz Dismisses Lindsey Convictions, Says That “Dr. Lindsey and Mr. 
Lee Were Put Through a Severe Ordeal” and That Lindsey Manufacturing, a “Small, Once Highly 
Respected Enterprise . . . Placed in Jeopardy,” FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/milestone-erased-judge-matz-dismisses-lindsey-convictions-says-
that-dr-lindsey-and-mr-lee-were-put-through-a-severe-ordeal-and-that-lindsey-manufacturing-a-
small-once-highly-respected-ente. 
153. Raymond Banoun et al., Eleventh Circuit Defines “Instrumentality” Broadly Under the FCPA, 
CADWALDER 1, 1 (May 2014), http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/newsletters/d031b31d3d 
3da94398c85d8a44292de7.pdf. 
154. Tara K. Giunta et al., Appellate Court Clarifies FCPA “Instrumentality” Definition, PAUL HASTINGS 
1, 4 (May 19, 2014), http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/stay-current-
esquenazi-client-alert.pdf. 
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4. Long-Standing SEC Enforcement Action 
While not an appellate court decision, another notable instance of judicial 
scrutiny of FCPA enforcement in 2014 was the conclusion of the SEC’s long-standing 
FCPA enforcement action against Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen.  By way of 
background, in 2012 the SEC charged Jackson (a former CEO of Noble Corporation, 
an oil and gas company) and Ruehlen (a current Director and Division Manager of 
a Noble subsidiary in Nigeria) with authorizing a customs agent to make payments 
on the company’s behalf “to Nigerian government officials to influence or induce 
them to (1) favorably process false paperwork, (2) grant temporary import permits 
(TIPs) [for oil rigs] based on the false paperwork, and (3) favorably exercise or abuse 
their discretion in granting extensions to these illicit TIPs.”155 
Jackson and Ruehlen mounted a defense and forced the SEC to prove its case, an 
occurrence which rarely happens in the FCPA context.156  For approximately two 
years there was much legal wrangling as the trial court judge granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the SEC’s claims that sought monetary damages 
while denying the motion to dismiss as to claims seeking injunctive relief.  Even 
though the court granted the motion as to the SEC’s monetary damage claims, the 
dismissal was without prejudice and the SEC was allowed to file an amended 
complaint.  That is indeed what happened, and leading up to trial the SEC’s case 
was consistently trimmed as the SEC attempted to meet its burden.  Among other 
things, a portion of the SEC’s claims were dismissed or abandoned on statute of 
limitations grounds and the trial court judge ruled, in an issue of first impression, 
that the SEC has the burden of negating the FCPA’s facilitation payments exception 
to the anti-bribery provisions.157 
Leading up to trial, the judge denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment, 
and in denying the SEC’s motion the judge expressed much skepticism regarding 
the validity of the SEC’s claims.158  Among other things, the judge questioned the 
 
155. Complaint at para. 1, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Jackson, No. 4:12-CV-00563 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 
2012).  The SEC’s enforcement action against Jackson and Ruehlen was based on the same core 
conduct as the SEC’s 2010 FCPA enforcement action against Noble Corp. in which the company, 
without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, agreed to an injunction and payment of 
disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $5,576,998. See SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and 
Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials, SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm. 
156. Will the SEC Be Put To Its Burden of Proof in the Jackson and Ruehlen Enforcement Action?, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/will-the-sec-be-put-to-its-burden-of-
proof-in-the-jackson-and-ruehlen-enforcement-action. 
157. See, e.g., July 3rd Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jul. 3, 2014), 
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158. “I Have Such Trouble Understanding The Facilitating Payment Exception”, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 
9, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/i-have-such-trouble-understanding-the-facilitating-
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SEC’s ability to negate the facilitation payments exception and expressed concern 
about the SEC’s position that the defendants violated the FCPA’s books and records 
provisions because Noble Corp. booked the alleged improper payments in a special 
facilitating payments account based on the good faith belief that they were indeed 
facilitating payments.159   
On the brink of the SEC’s first-ever FCPA trial, the parties agreed to settle.  
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, the defendants, who were not 
required to pay any civil fine or other monetary sanction, consented to a final 
judgment permanently restraining and enjoining them from violating the FCPA’s 
books and records provisions.160   
Even though the SEC’s FCPA Unit Chief called the resolution “a very good 
settlement” for the SEC, the fact is on the brink of the SEC’s first-ever FCPA trial, 
the SEC offered the defendants an extremely favorable settlement in what can only 
objectively be called a defense win.161 
B. Judicial Scrutiny of Related Enforcement Theories 
Given the general absence of substantive FCPA case law, one must often 
reference non-FCPA case law involving similar issues to best appreciate the many 
controversial aspects of FCPA enforcement.  In 2014, two Supreme Court decisions 
and an appellate court decision touched upon issues relevant to FCPA enforcement.   
1. Supreme Court Decisions 
Even though the Supreme Court declined cert. in Esquenazi, the general issue of 
corruption was on the Supreme Court’s docket in 2014. In McCutcheon v. FEC, the 
specific issue before the court was whether the aggregate limits on campaign 
contributions, which restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all 
political candidates or political committees, violated the First Amendment.162 
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy and Alito, the court held that such aggregate limits are valid under 
the First Amendment and in doing so dismissed the argument that such limits 
served the objective of combating corruption. The opinion recognized that “while 
preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may 
 
payment-exception. 
159. Id. 
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target only a specific type of corruption ‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”163  As to that type 
of corruption, the plurality opinion adopted a narrow view and 
stated: “[G]overnment regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate 
may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such 
support may afford.  Ingratiation and access are not corruption.”164 
The plurality opinion further stated: 
[S]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but 
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo 
corruption.  Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends 
large sums may garner influence over or access to elected officials 
or political parties. 
The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may 
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order 
to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.165 
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor and Kagan stated that the notion “that large aggregate contributions do 
not ‘give rise’ to ‘corruption’—is plausible only because the plurality defines 
‘corruption’ too narrowly.”166 
The dissenting opinion viewed corruption more broadly and stated: 
Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary chain of 
communication between the people and their representatives.  It 
derails the essential speech-to-government-action tie.  Where 
enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be 
heard.  Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought 
and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its 
point. 
Since the kinds of corruption that can destroy the link between 
public opinion and governmental action extend well beyond those 
the plurality describes, the plurality’s notion of corruption is flatly 
inconsistent with [basic constitutional rationales].167 
It is difficult to square the reasoning of the plurality opinion in McCutcheon with 
various aspects of FCPA enforcement.  Corruption ought to be corruption, plain and 
simple and the same rules and principles governing corruption of a “foreign official” 
under the FCPA ought to apply to corruption of U.S. “officials.”  Yet, as highlighted 
by McCutcheon there appears to be a double standard.  Against the backdrop of the 
 
163. Id. at 1450. 
164. Id. at 1441. 
165. Id. at 1450-51. 
166. Id. at 1466. 
167. Id. at 1467-68. 
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U.S. government bringing FCPA enforcement actions based on allegations that a 
company was seeking access to certain foreign officials or certain information or that 
company employees were seeking to ingratiate themselves with foreign officials 
through providing such items of value as a bottle of wine, flowers, karaoke bars or 
cigarettes—just remember, in the words of the Supreme Court, “ingratiation and 
access are not corruption.”   
The McCutcheon decision was not the only Supreme Court decision from 2014 
that touched upon issues relevant to FCPA enforcement.  In Daimler A.G. v. 
Bauman, the Supreme Court sharply criticized an agency theory that has seemingly 
served as the basis for several corporate FCPA enforcement actions. 
Prior to discussing the Bauman case it is useful to highlight certain background 
information. If one digs into certain corporate FCPA enforcement actions it would 
appear that legal liability seems to hop, skip, and jump around a multinational 
company.  This of course would be inconceivable in other areas of law, such as 
contract liability or tort liability, absent an “alter ego” / “piercing the veil” analysis 
for the simple reason that this is what the black letter law commands. 
However, with increasing frequency, the DOJ and SEC have advanced broad 
“agency” theories in which the acts of a subsidiary are attributed to a parent 
corporation absent any allegations to support an “alter ego” or “veil piercing” 
exception.168  Philip Urofsky (a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA enforcement 
attorney) has been one of the more forceful critics of this trend and he rightfully 
noted: 
[J]ust because a corporate FCPA enforcement action is 
resolved through an NPA rather than a DPA (or a guilty plea) does 
not excuse this approach—when the DOJ announces it will not 
prosecute but requires the company to admit to facts establishing 
a criminal violation of the law, it is stating, as a fact, that the 
company committed a crime.  In such case, it is obligated to 
demonstrate, through the pleadings, in whatever form they are 
presented, that it could, in fact, prove each and every element of the 
offense.169 
It is against this relevant backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Bauman, to 
determine “the authority of a court in the United States to entertain a claim brought 
by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely 
outside the United States.”170  Specifically, the complaint “alleged that during 
 
168. See Attachment A of Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Thomas A. Hanusik (April 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ralph-lauren/Ralph-Lauren.-NPA-
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169. Like a Kid in a Candy Store, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/like-
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170. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014). 
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Argentina’s 1976-1983 ‘Dirty War,’ Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-
Benz Argentina (MB Argentina) collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, 
detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or 
persons closely related to plaintiffs.”  Damages for the alleged human rights 
violations were sought from Daimler, and U.S. jurisdiction “over the lawsuit was 
predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a 
subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business 
in New Jersey.”171 
“The question presented,” as described by the Supreme Court, was “whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preclude[d] the District Court 
from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler . . . given the absence of any California 
connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.”172  
As noted by the court, the plaintiffs were seeking to hold “Daimler vicariously liable 
for MB Argentina’s alleged malfeasance” and it was noted that “MB Argentina was 
a subsidiary wholly owned by Daimler’s predecessor in interest.”173 
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavy on jurisdiction issues—including much 
discussion of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction—but as to the agency issue 
the court noted that “while plaintiffs ultimately persuaded the Ninth Circuit to 
impute MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, at no point, 
have they maintained that MBUSA is an alter ego of Daimler.”174 
The Court then stated: 
In sustaining the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on an agency theory, determining that MBUSA 
acted as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes and then 
attributing MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s agency analysis derived from Circuit precedent considering 
principally whether the subsidiary “performs services that are 
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not 
have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own 
officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. 
This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may 
be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts 
of its in-state subsidiary.  Daimler argues, and several Courts of 
Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be 
imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the 
latter as to be its alter ego.  The Ninth Circuit adopted a less 
rigorous test based on what it described as an “agency” relationship.  
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Agencies, we note, come in many sizes and shapes: “One may be an 
agent for some business purposes and not others so that the fact that 
one may be an agent for one purpose does not make him or her an 
agent for every purpose.”   A subsidiary, for example, might be its 
parent’s agent for claims arising in the place where the subsidiary 
operates, yet not its agent regarding claims arising elsewhere.  The 
Court of Appeals did not advert to that prospect.  But we need not 
pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of 
general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis 
be sustained. 
The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its 
observation that MBUSA’s services were “important” to Daimler, as 
gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those 
services itself if MBUSA did not exist.   Formulated this way, the 
inquiry into importance stacks the deck, for it will always yield a 
pro-jurisdiction answer: “Anything a corporation does through an 
independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably 
something that the corporation would do ‘by other means’ if the 
independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist.”  
The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears to subject foreign 
corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state 
subsidiary or affiliate . .. . 
. . . . 
It was therefore error for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Daimler, 
even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to it, was at home in 
California, and hence subject to suit there on claims by foreign 
plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had 
its principal impact in California.175 
Applying the verbiage in Bauman to the FCPA context, the notion that because a 
subsidiary’s services are important to a parent corporation—and thus the subsidiary 
is an agent of the parent corporation for purposes of imputing liability—stacks the 
deck, for it will always yield a pro-agency answer. 
The Bauman decision is also relevant to FCPA enforcement for another reason.  
In the Supreme Court’s 2013 Kiobel decision (a non-FCPA case, but a case in which 
the logic and rationale of many justices had direct bearing on certain aspects of 
FCPA enforcement and indeed can be viewed as disapproval of certain aspects of 
FCPA enforcement), the court expressed concern about the “delicate field of 
international relations” of expansive U.S. jurisdiction over foreign actors.176 
Continuing with this concern, in Bauman the Supreme Court stated: 
 
175. Id. at 758-62 (internal citations omitted).  
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[T]he transnational context of this dispute bears attention . . . . The 
Ninth Circuit . . . paid little heed to the risks to international comity 
its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed.  Other nations do 
not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction 
advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case. 
. . . . 
The Solicitor General informs us . . . that “‘foreign governments’ 
objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general 
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international 
agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.” . . . Considerations of international rapport thus 
reinforce our determination that subjecting Daimler to the general 
jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with the “fair 
play and substantial justice” due process demands.177 
It is nothing short of remarkable that the U.S. government urged restraint of 
expansive jurisdictional theories in Daimler because such “unpredictable 
applications” of expansive jurisdiction “could discourage foreign investors” and 
result in other foreign policy difficulties, while at the same time advancing 
unpredictable, creative, and dubious jurisdictional theories against foreign actors in 
FCPA enforcement actions.178 
For instance:  
• An FCPA enforcement action against French company Total 
S.A. (the third largest in FCPA history in terms of fine and 
penalty amount) was based on a single wire transfer 
(representing less than 1% of the alleged bribe payments at 
issue to Iranian officials) from a New York based account.179  
• An FCPA enforcement action against Japan-based JGC Corp. 
was based on the jurisdictional theory that certain alleged bribe 
payments to Nigerian officials flowed through U.S. bank 
accounts and that co-conspirators faxed or e-mailed information 
into the U.S. in furtherance of the bribery scheme.180   
• An FCPA enforcement action against Hungary-based Magyar 
Telekom was based on allegations that a company executive 
sent two e-mails to a Macedonian foreign official from his U.S. 
based e-mail address that passed through, was stored on, and 
transmitted from servers located in the U.S. and that certain 
electronic communications made in furtherance of the alleged 
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bribery scheme and the concealment of payments, including 
drafts of certain agreements and copies of certain contracts with 
intermediaries, were transmitted by company employees and 
others through U.S. interstate commerce or stored on computer 
servers located in the U.S.181  
• An FCPA enforcement action against Luxembourg-based 
Tenaris was based on allegations that a payment to an agent in 
connection with the alleged bribery scheme of an Uzbekistan 
official was wired through an intermediary bank located in New 
York.182 
2. Appellate Court Decision 
An appellate court decisions from 2014 also touched upon FCPA issues, 
specifically whether the FCPA contains a private right of action. 
3. Private Right of Action 
No doubt relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the Esquenazi case 
was that the issue presented was one of first impression that had not percolated in 
the appellate courts.  A reason for the dearth of substantive FCPA case law is 
because certain appellate courts have held that there is no private right of action 
under the FCPA.183  Therefore, DOJ and SEC enforcement actions present the only 
conceivable opportunities for judicial examination of the FCPA, yet as highlighted 
elsewhere in this article, most DOJ and SEC enforcement actions involve resolution 
vehicles that are not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny. 
In 2014, the Second Circuit concluded—consistent with prior appellate court 
decisions—that there is no private right of action under the FCPA.184   The Second 
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Circuit stated:  
[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.”  A federal statute may create a private right of action 
either expressly or, more rarely, by implication.  In considering 
whether a statute confers an implied private right of action, “[t]he 
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to 
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private 
right but also a private remedy.”  To discern Congress’s intent, “we 
look first to the text and structure of the statute.”  To “illuminate” 
this analysis, we also consider factors enumerated in Cort v. Ash, 
which include the following: 
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted, . . . –that is, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff?  In our analysis, we are mindful that “the Supreme Court 
has come to view the implication of private remedies in regulatory 
statutes with increasing disfavor. 
. . . . 
The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit certain entities and 
persons from, inter alia, corruptly making payments to foreign 
officials for the purpose of influencing official action in order to 
obtain business.  The text of the statute contains no explicit 
provision for a private right of action, although it does provide for 
civil and criminal penalties, and permits the Attorney General to 
seek injunctive relief.  Because “[t]he express provision of one 
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress 
intended to preclude others,” the structure of the statute, by 
focusing on public enforcement, tends to indicate the absence of a 
private remedy. 
The Cort v. Ash factors also do not support recognition of a private 
right.  The statute’s prohibitions focus on the regulated entities; the 
FCPA contains no language expressing solicitude for those who 
might be victimized by acts of bribery, or for any particular class of 
persons.  “Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than 
the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer 
rights on a particular class of persons.”  
Nor does the legislative history of the FCPA demonstrate an 
intention on the part of Congress to create a private right of action. 
. . .  [A] bill introduced by Senator Church in the 94th Congress 
included an express right of action for competitors of those who 
bribed foreign officials, that provision, however, was deleted by a 
committee of the Senate. 
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In the 95th Congress, which finally enacted the FCPA, a committee 
of the House of Representatives, in reporting out a bill that did not 
provide expressly for a private right of action, made a statement 
that the House “Committee intends that the courts shall recognize 
a private cause of action based on this legislation . . . on behalf of 
persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate 
bribery.”  We have three main problems with the [Plaintiff’s] 
reliance on this statement, and other aspects of the FCPA’s 
legislative history, as justification for judicial implication of a 
private right of action in its favor. 
First, the House committee’s statement was not repeated (and no 
endorsement of its substance was in any way suggested) in the 
reports of either the Senate committee considering the FCPA or the 
conference committee that reconciled the views of the House and 
Senate to produce the language of the FCPA as it was ultimately 
enacted.  Indeed, in the debate on the conference committee report, 
one conferee stated that the question of whether “courts will 
recognize [an] implied private right of action . . . was not 
considered in the Senate or during the conference, and thus [it] 
cannot be said that any intent is expressed at all on this issue.”  
Second, although the legislative history contains additional 
references to the desirability of a private right of action, they do not 
provide any clear indication of congressional intent to create one.  
Third, we note that this case illustrates the wisdom of Lamb, which 
avoids the question of what class of parties the FCPA was designed 
to protect.  Although we agree that the statute was primarily 
designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and 
domestic markets,” one might argue that it is principally the foreign 
governments whose processes might be corrupted. The [Plaintiff’s] 
claim highlights the obvious problem with the latter concern 
here: The foreign government supposedly to be “protect[ed]” by the 
FCPA was the entity that demanded the bribes in the first place. 
Finally, we note that although it has been nearly a quarter of a 
century since Lamb was decided, and although Congress has more 
recently amended the FCPA Congress has not chosen to override 
Lamb.  We conclude that there is no private right of action under 
the antibribery provisions of the FCPA . . . .185 
As indicated in the Second Circuit’s decision, there have been previous appellate 
court decisions addressing whether the FCPA has a private right of 
action.  However, in Lamb the primary reason articulated by the Sixth Circuit for 
declining a private right of action was something that never happened – at least 
until 2012 when the DOJ/SEC issued FCPA Guidance.  The Sixth Circuit stated: 
 
185. Id. at 170-71 (internal citations omitted). 
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Recognition of the plaintiffs’ proposed private right of action, in our 
view, would directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme 
presently in place.  Congress recently expanded the Attorney 
General’s responsibilities to include facilitating compliance with the 
FCPA.  Specifically, the Attorney General must “establish a 
procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries” by issuers of 
securities and other domestic concerns regarding “conformance of 
their conduct with the Department of Justice’s [FCPA] enforcement 
policy . . . .”  Moreover, the Attorney General must furnish “timely 
guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s [FCPA] 
enforcement policy . . . to potential exporters and small businesses 
that are unable to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to 
[FCPA] provisions.”  Because this legislative action clearly evinces 
a preference for compliance in lieu of prosecution, the introduction 
of private plaintiffs interested solely in post-violation enforcement, 
rather than pre-violation compliance, most assuredly would hinder 
congressional efforts to protect companies and their employees 
concerned about FCPA liability.186 
Prior to Lamb, the Fifth Circuit addressed a private right of action, albeit in dicta, 
in McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co. in which the court stated:  “[W]e find it 
inappropriate to imply a private cause of action from the statute.  The statute on its 
face shows no congressional intent to create a private action. Moreover, no legislative 
history exists referring to such an intent.”187  This last observation by the Fifth 
Circuit was obviously false given the legislative history discussed by the Second 
Circuit in Republic of Iraq. 
In short, the three appellate court decisions that address an FCPA private right 
of action are either: (1) based on a false premise (McLean); (2) based on a false 
premise at the time (Lamb); or (3) involved a unique and odd plaintiff (Republic of 
Iraq). 
An FCPA private right of action does warrant further consideration.188  For 
starters, courts have inferred private rights of action in many other provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”)189 and the FCPA is after all part of 
the ‘34 Act.  
Moreover, contrary to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Republic of Iraq, several 
of the Cort v. Ash factors for implying a private of right would seem to be met in the 
FCPA context.  Among the reasons Congress passed the FCPA was to level the 
playing field given how the discovered foreign corporate payments distorted free and 
 
186. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029-30 (internal citations omitted). 
187. McLean, 817 F.2d at 1219. 
188. Indeed several bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to amend the FCPA to include a 
limited private right of action.  See FCPA Reform Bill Introduced (But Not That One), FCPA 
PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-reform-bill-introduced-but-not-that-one. 
189. See, e.g., J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1964). 
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fair competition.190  Moreover, the SEC itself has stated on numerous occasions that 
FCPA enforcement is central to its mission of investor protection.191  An FCPA 
private right of action would further seem to be consistent with the underlying 
premise of the FCPA which is to reduce foreign bribery.192  Finally, “regulation of 
bribery directed at foreign officials cannot be characterized as a matter traditionally 
relegated to state control,” as even the Lamb court recognized.193 
At the very least, if there was an FCPA private right of action there would be 
substantially more case law of precedent concerning the FCPA’s provisions than 
currently exists. 
Conclusion 
This article provides a snapshot of FCPA and related developments from 2014 
with the goal of providing value to anyone who seeks an informed based of 
knowledge regarding the FCPA and related legal and policy issues.  The FCPA is 
one of the most important laws governing business conduct in the global 
marketplace as it affects all businesses and individuals engaged in international 
commerce.  For this reason, and whether the specific issue is: 
• FCPA enforcement statistics; 
• The wide spectrum of FCPA enforcement actions and how the 
breadth of such actions sends confusing compliance messages to 
those subject to the FCPA; 
• The wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA 
enforcement and the policy issues which flow from the gap; 
• The problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve 
alleged instance of FCPA scrutiny; or 
• Judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement theories or those 
otherwise relevant to FCPA enforcement 
The FCPA snapshot depicted in this article matters. 
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